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A SOCIALIST APPROACH TO RISK
RICHARD L. ABEL*
All of us continually confront the risk of physical harm. We can
respond to those inevitable risks in three ways. We can redress harm
after it has occurred. We can punish those who cause harm. And we
can control risk before it has resulted in harm. In a recent article I
criticized our present legal regime for its failure to realize any of these
goals.I Here I want to offer an alternative approach to risk, one that is
consistent with the ideals of socialism. I begin by arguing that our pri-
mary objective ought to be to control risk; compensation and punish-
ment must be subordinate. Then I propose two ideals that should
inform a socialist approach to the allocation of risk: autonomy and
equality. Building on this foundation, I consider what those ideals
would entail in the spheres of production (work) and reproduction
(consumption). I analyze why capitalism is hostile to those ideals and
review some of the efforts to attain them: producer and consumer co-
operatives within capitalism and worker ownership and control in ex-
isting socialist societies. I conclude that it is both desirable and
possible to grant people greater autonomy and equality in their en-
counters with risk and that the effort to do so is inextricably associated
with the struggle for socialism.
I. THE PRIMACY OF CONTROL
The present legal regime fails to compensate the injured, punish
wrongdoers, or control risk. Since I presented those criticisms at some
length in my earlier article,2 I will merely summarize them here. The
law fails to compensate victims fairly because it does both too little and
too much. It discriminates among victims on the basis of occupation,
class, race, and gender. It preserves (and symbolically validates) the
unequal distribution of income and wealth. It commodifies physical
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. B.A., Harvard, 1962; J.D.,
Columbia, 1965; Ph.D., London, 1974.
I am grateful to the following for comments and criticism, although they bear no re-
sponsibility for the final form of this article and undoubtedly disagree with some or all of it:
Emily Abel, Allison Anderson, Harry Glasbeek, Steven Kelman, David Nelken, Gary
Schwartz, Steven Shiffrin, and John Stick. I also benefitted from a discussion with the mem-
bers of our local critical legal studies group.
1. Abel,A Critique ofAmerican Tort Law, 8 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 199 (1981). A shorter
version of that article will appear in THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
2. See Abel, supra note 1.
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integrity, emotional well-being, love, even life itself. The compensa-
tory system is distorted because the same remedy simultaneously pur-
ports to punish and to control, but the three functions often are
incompatible. Therefore, I urged that compensation be severed from
punishment and control through the adoption of a system of universal
minimum income maintenance and comprehensive medical care.3 This
also would allow the causal agent to show care and concern for the
victim without fear of inviting civil or criminal liability.4
The law also fails to punish wrongdoers appropriately.5 Again, it
errs in both directions. It does too little because the state has appropri-
ated the victim's injury and sense of grievance but lacks the latter's
incentive to redress the wrong.6 As a result, criminal penalties rarely
are inflicted. It does too much because the state often inflicts punish-
ment where it is not ethically justified, in pursuit of the goals of com-
pensation and control. Therefore, I urged that punishment be inflicted
separately. I advocate below that control be entrusted to those who are
placed at risk. This should reduce the incidence of injury and thus the
occasions when punishment might be appropriate. Furthermore, when
someone is injured, punishment is less likely to be merited since the
causal agent has been exposed to the same risks as the victim, and
chance alone may explain who was hurt. If the causal agent expresses
sympathy and regret (and fear of liability will not discourage anyone
from doing so), nothing further may be required. But if the victim still
seeks recognition for the wrong suffered, the collectivity of those ex-
posed to and responsible for risk should impose the punishment, which
might be limited to informal social sanctions but also might include job
3. Harry J. Glasbeek and Terence Ison of Osgoode Hall Law School have noted that
this recommendation might inadvertently have undesirable distributive consequences: to
the extent that the working class and the poor are disproportionately the victims of trau-
matic injury - in the workplace, on the roads, or as a result of defective products - any
reduction in the level of compensation they receive will be regressive.
4. Tort law has sought to promote this goal by excluding evidence of subsequent re-
pairs when offered to prove prior negligence. See, e.g., Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803,
805 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam). Recently, however, some jurisdictions have abrogated that
rule in product liability cases where the plaintiff wishes to prove that a product has been
redesigned in order to show that its prior design was defective. See, e.g., Caprara v.
Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
5. See, e.g., CENTER FOR LAW IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF
CALIFORNIA'S OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH LAWS (1979); CENTER FOR LAW IN THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST, CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF CALIFORNIA'S OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH LAWS: A
STATUS REPORT (1980); cf. C. GERSUNY, WORK HAZARDS AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 1-2
(1981) (attempts to address the problem of exposure to risk in the workplace through the
criminal justice system have met with strong opposition).
6. See N. CHRISTIE, LIMITS TO PAIN (1981); Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1977).
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rotation, suspension from work, temporary exclusion from the con-
sumer cooperative, or ultimately expulsion. State punishment (fines
and imprisonment) will be needed only when victim and causal agent
belong to different collectivities - a residual category of injuries, if one
that still is important.
But the greatest failure of the present legal system is its inability to
control the risks to which people are exposed. Control must be our first
priority, not compensation or punishment.7 This view is asserted in
popular maxims: safety first; an ounce of prevention is worth a pound
of cure; better safe than sorry. It is the foundation of our criminal law:
we do not wait for crimes to happen and then allow the wrongdoers
simply to compensate the victims. And prevention is our immediate,
spontaneous response to threats to ourselves or those we love: we are
interested first in protection and security, and only if those fail are we
concerned with compensation or punishment. Furthermore, if we con-
scientiously pursued the objective of control, the number of injuries
would be reduced drastically and the need for both compensation and
punishment would be minimized.
The present legal system seeks to control risk in two ways:
through the imposition of civil liability to compensate victims (what
Calabresi calls general or market deterrence) and through regulation
(specific deterrence).8 In my earlier article I advanced a number of rea-
sons why market deterrence does not and cannot work.9 There can be
no market deterrence because there is no market for injury and illness,
so that the evaluation of a wrong by a judge, jury, or legislature is both
paternalistic and inherently inaccurate. Safety can be optimized only
for an activity, but liability decisions necessarily focus on a temporally
delimited act. Causality is probabilistic, multiple, and continuous, but
liability decisions are dichotomous and individual. There is ines-
7. A nice illustration of the preoccupation with cure at the expense of prevention is the
following. Armand Hammer, chairman of the board of Occidental Petroleum Corp., has
offered a million dollars to the scientist who discovers a "cure" for cancer. L.A. Times, Dec.
4, 1981, § I. Quite apart from the fact that cancer is not a single disease, so that there can be
no "cure," this emphasis on medical research conveniently distracts attention from the fact
that the petrochemicals that Hammer's company produces are known to be among the prin-
cipal causes of cancer. See S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER (1978). Furthermore,
Occidental owns the Hooker Chemical Co., which has polluted the notorious Love Canal,
exposing the local populace to numerous carcinogenic substances. See M. BROWN, LAYING
WASTE, Part 1 (1981); L. GIBBS, LOVE CANAL: MY STORY (1982).
8. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-69 (1970). To the very large extent
that the present legal system is based on fault, it is even less effective in achieving optimum
levels of safety because of the likelihood of erroneous factfinding and the enormous transac-
tion costs introduced by the need to adjudicate fault in each individual case.
9. Abel, supra note 1, at 203-06.
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capable tension between control and compensation, most clearly visible
in the prevalence of insurance. The behavior of those held liable will
not be altered (or will not be changed sufficiently) if liability costs are
an insignificant proportion of the price they charge for goods or serv-
ices, if demand for those goods or services is relatively price inelastic,
or if the market in which they operate is oligopolistic. When the theory
of market deterrence is applied to victims (doctrines of contributory or
comparative negligence), it reduces the incentive of the tortfeasor to
exercise care,' 0 though there is little evidence that it increases the vic-
tim's concern for his own safety. Finally, and most important, market
deterrence internalizes only a fraction of all accident costs; I I it does so
in a way that exposes people to different levels of risk on the basis of
their class, race, and gender; and it motivates efforts to minimize liabil-
ity not risk.'2 Because deterrence is at least as much a function of the
certainty that sanctions will follow conduct endangering another as it is
a function of the severity of those sanctions,13 the extremely low
10. For graphic descriptions of the use of these doctrines by employers to evade liability,
see C. GERSUNY, supra note 5, ch. 3. This tactic did not cease with the passage of workers'
compensation laws. In the trial of the first of more than 150 cases of occupational disease
caused by exposure to asbestos, currently pending in Maine, the widow of a worker who
died of mesothelioma in 1977 argued that the defendant firms had known of the dangers of
asbestos since the 1930s but suppressed the research. The jury, however, found that the
worker's own negligence in failing to protect himself from asbestos dust was equal to or
greater than the combined negligence of the two firms and thus denied all recovery, in ac-
cordance with Maine's partial comparative negligence law. L.A. Times, Dec. 6, 1981, § I, at
14.
11. It has been estimated that prior to workers' compensation, when tort liability was
predicated on fault, only 15% of all injured workers received any compensation, see C. GER-
SUNY, supra note 5, at 104, and even their recoveries were grossly inadequate, see id., ch. 4.
Furthermore, there is little or no evidence that the introduction of workers' compensation,
which was intended to be a no-fault scheme and thus virtually automatic, actually reduced
accident rates. Id. at 66; see Abel, supra note 1, at 200 n. 160.
One index of the frequency of claims (though a very imperfect one) is the number of
jury trials. In the 20 year period 1960-79, the number of jury trials in tort cases in Cook
County, Illinois (including Chicago) declined by 50%, from 1200 a year in 1966-1968 to 814
in 1975-1979. M. PETERSON & G. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS AND VER-
DICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960-1979 (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 5 (1982).
12. Tortfeasors use coercion and deceit to evade or reduce legal responsibility, with con-
siderable success. See C. GERSUNY, supra note 5, ch. 4. The agent of a cotton mill wrote to
the company's insurer in 1902: "I am trying the Chicopee method of settlement, i.e., waiting
till they get hungry for money before going to see them." Id. at 68; see generally H. Ross,
SETTLED OUT OF COURT (1970). Settlements, of course, reflect predictions about what the
outcome would be if the case were tried. It is significant, therefore, that in the last 20 years
the success rate of tort actions tried to a jury in Cook County, Illinois has remained a con-
stant 51%, although the success rate of particular causes of action has changed, as well as the
mix of tort claims. M. PETERSON & G. PRIEST, supra note 1 i, at 7.
13. See, e.g., F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME
CONTROL 158-71 (1973).
[VOL. 41
1982] A SOCIALIST APPROACH TO RISK 699
probability of any sanction virtually nullifies the possibility of a general
deterrent effect.
Recognizing the failure of market deterrence to control risk, the
state has established a large and complex regulatory apparatus that
promulgates precise standards of conduct, which it enforces by injunc-
tions and ultimately by civil and criminal penalties.14 Yet the bank-
ruptcy of state regulation is so well known and has been demonstrated
so often that a brief enumeration of the reasons for its failure should be
sufficient. 5 Regulation is paternalistic: regulators are not as strongly
motivated to implement regulations as are those whom the regulations
ostensibly benefit.' 6 For instance, regulators may focus on the cata-
strophic accident, because of its political ramifications, rather than on
the daily risks and injuries, which cumulatively might be more seri-
ous. 17 Alternatively, they may devote their limited resources to enforc-
14. Between 1970 and 1979 the federal government created 20 new regulatory agencies,
and the staff of all federal regulatory agencies increased threefold while their budgets grew
sixfold. R. POOLE, INSTEAD OF REGULATION vii (R. Poole ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
INSTEAD OF REGULATION]. Although most regulatory activity does not concern personal
safety, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) have
been visibly, if not always energetically, occupied with that goal.
That regulation is justified by market failure is strongly suggested by the evidence of
declining accident rates following its introduction. See, e.g., J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING
SAFETY: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH POLICY 117 (1979); Lewis-Beck & Afford, Can Government Regulate Safety? The
Coal Mine Example, 74 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 745 (1980); Pearson, Organizational Response to
Occupational Injury and Disease.- The Case of the Uranium Industry 57 Soc. FORCES 23, 32-
33 (1978).
15. Abel, supra note 1, at 204-05. Workers themselves certainly place little faith in regu-
lation, even in an area like mining, where the safety rules and enforcement mechanisms are
more developed. See Fitzpatrick, Adapting to Danger- .4 Particiant Observation Study of an
Underground Mine, 7 SoC. WORK & OCCUPATIONS 131, 143 (1980). Whereas in the past
most of the criticism of regulation has come from the left, which sees it as ineffective and
even deceitful, e.g., G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1887-1916 (1965); S. LAZA-
RUs, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS (1974), today it is the right (old and new) that has unleashed
torrents of vituperation on the regulatory agencies for "destroying" American capitalism,
see, e.g., M. BARAM, ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION (1982); INSTEAD OF REGULATION,
supra note 14. That the last represents the position of special interests is strongly suggested
by the list of those who supported the research and writing of the latter book: the Ford
Motor Co. Fund, the General Mills Foundation, Abbott Laboratories, the American Board
of Trade, Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., Gulf Oil Corp., Kellogg Co., and Pfizer,
Inc. See INSTEAD OF REGULATION, supra note 14, at x. The ideological move to the right
also can be seen in more balanced critiques. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (J.
Wilson ed. 1980); SOCIAL REGULATION (E. Bardach & R. Kagan eds. 1982); P. TEMIN, TAK-
ING THEIR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1980).
16. See, e.g., D. BERMAN, DEATH ON THE JOB: OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
STRUGGLES IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 4 (1978).
17. Carson, The Other Price of Britain's Oil." Regulating Safety on Offshore Oil Installa-
tions in the British Sector of the North Sea, 4 CONTEMP. CRISES 239, 256 (1980).
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ing safety rules at the less rather than the more dangerous worksites.'s
They fail to respond to known risks.' 9 They may focus their efforts on
more privileged workers.2" Their powers frequently are inadequate to
their responsibilities. 21 They often fail to use the powers they are given,
preferring conciliation to formal adversary proceedings, seeking mild
penalties rather than heavy fines or imprisonment. 22 They suffer from
bureaucratization and a tendency to routinize their activities.23 They
necessarily are legalistic and constrained by cumbersome procedures;
as a result, there are endless delays between complaint and response.24
Increasingly they are held accountable to economistic criteria and their
regulations are overruled in the name of cost-benefit analysis.25 Their
18. Steams, Fact and Fiction ofa Model Enforcement Bureaucracy- The Labour Inspec-
torate of Sweden, 6 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 1, 12, 14 (1979). But see Settle & Weisbrod, Occupa-
tional Safety and Health and the Public Interest, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 285, 299 (B. Weisbrod, J. Handler & N. Komesar eds. 1978).
19. The Atomic Energy Commission (the predecessor of the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission) knew of the dangers of uranium mining for 20 years before it took any regulatory
action, Pearson, supra note 14, at 24.
20. Settle & Weisbrod, supra note 18, at 299-300.
21. See, e.g., P. SCHRAG, COUNSEL FOR THE DECEIVED: CASE STUDIES IN CONSUMER
FRAUD (1972). See generally Kelman, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, in
THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 236, 255-63 (J. Wilson ed. 1980).
22. HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH: INADEQUATE ENFORCE-
MENT AND STALLED REVIEW I (C. 1975); Carson, supra note 17, at 259-60; Perkel, A Labor
View of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 23 LAB. L.J. 511 (1972); Steams, supra note
18, at 7-9, 19-20. But see R. KAGAN & J. SCHOLZ, GOING BY THE BOOK (1982); Kagan &
Scholz, The "Criminology of the Corporation " and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies, 7
JAHRBUCH FOR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE 352 (1980). The new director of
OSHA, Thorne Auchter, has instructed inspectors to treat employers in a "cooperative
nonadversarial manner" and to "emphasize positive findings in their reports." The Guard-
ian, Dec. 2, 1981. For a comparison of the styles of American and Swedish occupational
health and safety inspectors, see S. KELMAN, REGULATING AMERICA, REGULATING SWE-
DEN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY (1981).
23. Steams, supra note 18, at 8 n.14.
24. On June 28, 1974, a maintenance employee at the Whirlpool Corp. factory in
Marion, Ohio fell to his death because a guard screen was alleged to have been inadequate.
The Secretary of Labor ordered an investigation and subsequently issued a citation requir-
ing immediate abatement of the hazard and proposing a $600 penalty. Nearly five years
after the death, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission affirmed the cita-
tion but allowed Whirlpool another six months in which to correct the condition. Whirlpool
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and that deci-
sion still was pending in February 1980. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 6 n.4
(1980).
25. Settle & Weisbrod, supra note 18, at 305-08. Compare Indus. Union Dep't v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Before promulgating a more stringent health standard,
the Secretary of Labor must determine that the workplace is not safe - that it threatens the
workers with a significant risk of harm) with Am. Textile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490
(1981) (OSHA not required to undertake cost-bencfit analysis in promulgating standards
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act - standards must only be "feasible" - i.e.,
capable of being done). But see Noble, Cost-Beneit .Analysis: The Regulation ofBusiness or
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loyalties are divided between those they are directed to protect and the
industries or enterprises they must regulate.26 They share with the lat-
ter a common background, expertise, and daily work experience. This
leads to particularistic relationships, an interweaving of career lines
(the revolving door between industry and government), cooperation,
and ultimately capture of the regulator by the regulated. 27 Inadequate
funding adversely affects the level of regulatory activity and the compe-
tence and dedication of staff.28 Finally, of course, they are subject to
the political winds: if regulation may increase when labor or consum-
ers grow more powerful or the state feels a need for legitimation,29 it
also can be curtailed drastically when capital is politically ascendant, as
shown by the Reagan Administration's attacks on OSHA, the CPSC,
and EPA.3"
Scienqfic Pornography?, 11 HEALTH POL'Y ADVISORY CENTER BULL. 1 (July/Aug. 1980);
Kelman, Cost-Benet Analysis.: An Ethical Critique, 4 REG. 33 (Jan./Feb. 1981).
26. M. CRENSON, THE UN-POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTION (1971); C. GERSUNY, supra note
5, at 30-51; J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA
AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940-1975 (1977); Car-
son, supra note 17; Pearson, supra note 14, at 32-33.
27. M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 88-96
(1955); R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION (1970); M. GREEN, B.
MOORE, JR. & B. WASSERSTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM (1972); S. LAZARUS,
supra note 15; J. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST (1970); Carson, supra note 17, at 251;
Steams, supra note 18, at 14. The ultimate form of capture is corruption: a physician re-
cently was charged with giving $30,000 to an official of the Food and Drug Administration
to secure the latter's approval of DMSO, L.A. Times, Dec. 19, 1981, § I, at 1.
28. The California Department of Health Services, for instance, has been able to issue
final permits to only 18 of the 1,600 companies that handle hazardous wastes in the state.
L.A. Times, Sept. 30, 1981, § I, at 2. OSHA's 2,800 inspectors are responsible for health and
safety at five million workplaces. Of the 4,000 standards OSHA is charged with enforcing,
only 15% get cited even once a year, and 20 standards account for 40% of all citations. See
Smith, Protecting Workers' Health and Safety, in INSTEAD OF REGULATION, supra note 14,
at 311, 313-14; cf. C. GERSUNY, supra note 5, at 29-30 (inadequacy of early twentieth cen-
tury state factory inspectors). But see Kelman, supra note 21, at 247-48.
29. J. PAGE & M.-W. O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES ch. 8 (1975); Kelman, supra note 21, at
238-42; Steams, supra note 18, at 3.
30. See Crawford, OSHA: Court Saves Health Standard - For Now, In These Times,
July 15, 1981, at 5; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH WEEK (Oct. 26, 1981); Randolph,
Mine Accident Rise Linked to Reagan Policy, L.A. Times, Jan. 25, 1982, § I, at 1; Shabecoff,
Environmental Charges Off Sharply, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1981, at A-16, col. 1. In mid-1979
the Environmental Protection Agency began seeking court enforcement of its orders against
major polluters. It filed 7 cases that year and 43 in 1980. Under the Reagan administration,
however, new filings dropped to 7 in 1981, and none were filed in the first three months of
1982. Furthermore, high agency officials made offers of leniency that undermined the efforts
of enforcement personnel to negotiate satisfactory settlements. Randolph, EPA Inaction on
Hazardous Wastes Laid to Disruptive Reorganizations of Agency, L.A. Times, Apr. 3, 1982,
§ I, at 6. For an analysis of the ways in which opponents of regulation can dilute its effi-
ciency, see T. MATHIESEN, LAW, SOCIETY AND POLITICAL ACTION: TOWARDS A STRATEGY
UNDER LATE CAPITALISM (1980).
The Reagan administration has justified its attacks on federal regulatory agencies by
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II. Two PRINCIPLES OF RISK ALLOCATION
A. Autonomy
Each person ought to be able to control the risk to which he or she
is exposed.3  The very nature of risk - the fact that it can be described
only statistically, that particular injuries cannot be predicted - makes
it impossible to attain this goal completely. But at the very least no one
ought to be subjected to a risk whose nature or level is determined by
another. This ideal is affirmed by the most diverse ethical traditions. It
is a derivation from the Kantian moral imperative.3 2 It is consistent
with the most uncompromising libertarianism.33 And it is an inspira-
tion for one of the "two participations" advocated by Mao Zedong -
participation by workers in all administrative decisionmaking. 34 It is
not just moral philosophers who embrace this principle; numerous ex-
claiming that it wants to hand over such responsibiliiies to the states. Yet the inadequacy of
state regulation was precisely the reason for the creation of agencies like OSHA in the first
place. See D. BERMAN, supra note 16, at 56-59; J. PAGE & M.-W. O'BRIEN, supra note 29;
Settle & Weisbrod, supra note 18, at 310 n.91; Zalusky, The Worker Views the Enforcement of
Safety Laws, 26 LAB. L.J. 224 (1975). That inadequacy is not surprising; students of federal-
ism long have argued that state and local governments are more susceptible to influence by
narrowly defined interest groups. See Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process- Historical
and Contemporary Analysis of the American System, 14 L. & Soc'Y REV. 663, 705 (1980).
31. I am not taking an absolutist position here. The risks that a person chooses to en-
counter necessarily affect others: intimates of the potential victim, friends and acquaint-
ances, citizens of the social or political unit that ultimately may be asked to care for either
the injured victim or the victim's dependents, or both. For it is the rare, and clearly abhor-
rent, society that leaves its ill or injured to care for themselves, or die. See C. TURNBULL,
THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE (1972). Contemporary law recognizes this interdependence in sev-
eral ways. A person who endangers himself may be liable to someone who intervenes to
prevent injury or to rescue. See, eg, Carney v. Buyea, 271 A.D. 338, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902
(1946); Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc. 2d 782, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1960). We also require hikers,
mountain climbers, etc., to pay for the costs of their rescues. I would argue, therefore, that
we have a duty to others to refrain from inappropriate or unnecessary risks to ourselves.
32. I. KANT, Theory of Ethics, in SELECTIONS 268, 309 (T. Greene ed. 1929). "[Ajct as to
treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end
withal, never as a means only."
33. M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1980). Bourgeois economists
similarly insist that only the individual can decide correctly how much risk he wishes to
encounter, e.g., M. BAILEY, REDUCING RISKS TO LIFE: MEASUREMENT OF THE BENEFITS
(1980); Broome, Trying to Value a Lfe, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91 (1978); Cook, The Value of a
Human Life in the Demandfor Safety, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 710 (1978); Linnerooth, The Value
of a Human L!fe:, A Review of the Models, 17 ECON. INQUIRY 52 (1979); Mishan, Evaluation
of Life and Limb." A TheorelicalApproach, 79 J. POL. ECON. 687, 703 (1971); Rhoads, How
Much Should We Spend to Save a Lie?, [1978] PUB. INTEREST 74, 78, 85. But see Etzioni,
How Much is a L!fe Worth, 9 Soc. POL'Y 4 (Mar./Apr. 1979); Green & Waitzman, Cost,
Benefit, and Class, 7 WORKING PAPERS FOR A NEW Soc'Y 39 (1980).
34. See Whyte, Bureaucracy and Modernization in China. The Maoist Critique, 38 AM.
Soc. REV. 149 (1975). For a skeptical view about the degree of control that ordinary work-
ers in Chinese industry exercise, see Walder, Participative Management and Worker Control
in China, 8 Soc. WORK & OCCUPATIONS 224 (1981).
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tant laws and policies also endorse it, as do the value preferences of
ordinary people.
The doctrine of informed consent asserts that no one ought to be
subjected to a risk in the course of either therapy or experimentation
unless it has been fully disclosed and freely accepted by the patient or
subject? 5 A physician who has not complied with this standard may be
liable in tort.36 Scholarly research now is similarly constrained, and we
are outraged when deception or coercion are consciously employed:
when drugs are tested on prisoners,37 soldiers exposed to radiation,38 or
treatment withheld from patients known to be ill, as in the Tuskegee
syphillis study.39 The experiments by Nazi doctors on concentration
camp inmates are the ultimate horror.'
The doctrine of assumption of risk is justified by invoking the right
of people to choose danger rather than safety, but the very narrow in-
terpretation courts have placed on it in recent years - often tanta-
mount to abrogation - testifies to the paramount importance of
assuring that risks are known thoroughly and chosen voluntarily."
35. J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 523-49 (1972). Consent is
necesary, of course, because these are intentional torts. Yet the distinction between inten-
tional torts and negligence or even strict liability is of dubious value. Is conduct any less
intentional when the capitalist entrepreneur knows that X percent of his employees or Y
percent of the consumers of his products will suffer injury or illness?
36. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
37. See J. KATZ, supra note 35, ch. 13.
38. H. ROSENBERG, ATOMIC SOLDIERS: AMERICAN VICTIMS OF NUCLEAR EXPERI-
MENTS (1980); H. WASSERMAN & N. SOLOMON, KILLING OUR OWN: THE DISASTER OF
AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE WITH ATOMIC RADIATION (1982). Soldiers also have been exposed
to dioxin, see M. OHL & T. ENSIGN, GI GUINEA PIGS (1980), and to LSD, see L.A. Times,
Dec. 29, 1981, § I, at 18. In the latter case the army did not inform the victims of the experi-
ments for more than 20 years. Id.
A former Army medic, Van R. Brandon, has alleged that in 1956 and 1957 he was
ordered to keep two sets of records - one accurate and one deliberately falsified - of the
levels of radiation to which soldiers were exposed during Army tests of nuclear weapons in
Nevada. The accurate record was kept locked up; the false records shown to the men indi-
cated that no one had received more than the approved dose. Evening Outlook (Santa
Monica, Cal.), Feb. 8, 1982, at A-I; id., Feb. 12, 1982, at A-I.
39. J. JONES, BAD BLOOD (1981). In the Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphillis in the
Negro Male, the U.S. Public Health Service in Macon County, Alabama, conducted a death-
watch over 400 black sharecroppers from 1932-1972 in order to prove that Blacks and
Whites responded differently to the disease.
Recently, it has seriously been suggested that the elderly should be used to handle
the disposal of nuclear wastes and clean up after a nuclear war because they have less time
to live and thus a lower probability of contracting cancer. L.A. Times, Dec. 2, 1981, § I, at
15.
40. J. KATZ, supra note 35, at 292-306.
41. In most American jurisdictions, whatever remains of assumption of risk has been
assimilated to comparative negligence, so that it diminishes a plaintiff's damages but does
not bar recovery. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Garcia, 75 Cal. App. 3d 874, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503
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The difficulty of satisfying these conditions is one reason why the doc-
trine has been rejected categorically in the workplace.42 A great deal of
recent legislation is dedicated to ensuring that people are aware of the
risks to which they are exposed: the labeling of food and drugs, warn-
ings on household goods, and rules granting workers the right to know
the dangers of the workplace, especially those deriving from toxic
chemicals.
But the right to know the risk is only a prerequisite to the equally
important right to control it. Consumers often appear to enjoy the lat-
ter simply by virtue of their capacity to choose between products or
services and to choose whether to consume at all (although both
choices often may be illusory). The Supreme Court recently declared
that the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 grants workers a
similar right.43 Noting that workers already are entitled to strike over
safety issues 4 and can refuse to work under abnormally dangerous
conditions without violating a no-strike clause,45 the Court held that
the Act protects a worker from employer discrimination if he chooses
''not to perform his assigned task because of a reasonable apprehension
of death or serious injury coupled with a reasonable belief that no less
drastic alternative is available." 46
Autonomous control over risk is not something forced upon reluc-
tant consumers, workers, and citizens by an intrusive government.
Americans of all classes, occupations, and backgrounds share the desire
for autonomy in their work, whether this is expressed as the desire to be
free from the foreman's surveillance, to go into business for oneself, or
to be a professional.4 7 Autonomy is valued no less strongly outside
(1977); Kopischkev v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668 (Mont. 1980); Farley v. M M
Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975); Bittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 1979).
42. See 1 A. LARSON, LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4.50 (1952); see also Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 53-54 (1976).
43. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
44. See id. at 16-18; see also Atelson, Threats to Health and Safety: Employee Self-Help
under the NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REV. 647 (1975). The number of work-related stoppages
increased greatly between 1966 and 1975. See C. GERSUNY, supra note 5, at 126. In 1976,
371 collective bargaining agreements gave the 1.9 million workers covered the right to refuse
unsafe work. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULL. No. 1425-
16, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: SAFETY AND HEALTH PROVISIONS 19-
20 (1976).
45. 445 U.S. at 16-18.
46. Id. at 3-4.
47. REPORT OF A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY, DEP'T OF HEALTH EDUCA-
TION AND WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 15-23 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WORK IN
AMERICA]; E. CHINOY, AUTOMOBILE WORKERS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 86 (1955).
The desire for autonomy is especially strong with respect to danger. See Fitzpatrick, supra
note 15; Haas, Learning Real Feelings. A Study of High Steel Iron workers' Reactions to Fear
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work: witness the consumer and environmental movements, the de-
mand for safe streets and crime control, pressure for neighborhood
governance, even the anti-busing campaigns (which is not to excuse
their racist content). Outside the United States (as well as within) the
extraordinary wave of opposition to American and Soviet nuclear
weapons in England, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain,
and Portugal - hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated in each
country in the fall of 1981 - indicates the anger of West Europeans at
being held hostage by super-power politics.
Capitalism does not, and cannot, respect the right of each individ-
ual to choose his or her own level of risk. Because the owners of capi-
tal, by definition, control the means of production, they decide the risks
that workers, consumers, and the victims of pollution will incur. 8 This
relationship is not reciprocal: workers, consumers, and citizens rarely,
if ever, determine the risks to which the owners of capital will be ex-
posed. Although various mechanisms purport to redress this inequality
of power, none succeeds in restoring autonomy to those placed at risk.
Tort law claims to return victims to the "status quo ante"; but the rem-
edy is not chosen by the victim but rather is set by a judge or jury.
Workers' compensation does not even pretend to achieve restitution;
and its remedies are established by a legislature, which is even more
remote from the victim. Acknowledging the inadequacy of "general
deterrence," the state has created regulatory agencies; but once again it
is an administrator, not the potential victim, who decides what risks
should be tolerated.49 And just as those exposed to risk are deprived of
and Danger, 4 Soc. WORK & OCCUPATIONS 147, 162-66 (1977); The Costs ofCleanAir: How
Much Should They Count?, 2 REP. FROM CENTER FOR PHIL. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5 (1982).
48. C. GERSUNY, supra note 5, ch. 2.
49. Because they criticize regulation as paternalistic, many economists have urged that
OSHA adopt an injury tax as an alternative. See, e.g., J. MENDELOFF, supra note 14, at 24-
31; R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: ITS GOALS AND ACHIEVE-
MENTS 78-85 (1976); Nichols & Zeckhauser, Government Comes to the Workplace.- An As-
sessment of OSHA, 49 PUB. INTEREST 36 (1977); Smith, The Feasibility ofan "Injury Tax"
Approach to Occupational Safety, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 730 (1974). But this solution
would be no less paternalistic: the amount of the tax still would be set by administrators, not
workers; and employers who could pay the tax and yet operate profitably would be able to
subject workers to risk with impunity. It is not surprising, therefore, that workers are critical
of such a tax. See McLean & Schneck, Client Group Attitudes Toward Alternative Forms of
Industrial Safety Regulation, 8 POL'Y STUD. J. 392, 398 (1979). A historical antecedent of
this critique can be found in a surprising, if highly respected, source:
According to the law, each death costs the company about $5,000. . .and each cripple
costs $10,000. . . . These compensations are due so long as the company does not
introduce certain precautionary measures. But they have calculated that the four hun-
dred casualties a year cost less than would the necessary precautions. The company
therefore does not introduce them.
Letter from Max Weber to his mother (1904), quoted in Stearns, supra note 18, at 1.
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the power to decide what their own health is worth, so they are denied
control over the safety precautions themselves. Each of the remedial
mechanisms - tort litigation, workers' compensation, and regulation
- leaves most decisions about safety in the hands of capital.
Bourgeois economists will object that choice is the foundation of
capitalism.5" But the choices that capitalism offers do not remotely re-
semble autonomous control over risk.5' Workers sometimes may be
able to choose the capitalist for whom they will work;52 but they cannot
choose whether to work for capital; and they do not control directly the
level or nature of the risk to which they will be exposed.53 Even under
optimum conditions labor can only offer to trade wages, hours, or other
benefits for greater safety; capital may, and frequently does, refuse to
bargain over safety - reserving it as a management prerogative - and
never relinquishes control over safety.54 But it is just as important to
50. Smith, supra note 28, at 336 ("There is a substantial body of evidence indicating that
the market for job safety does exist and that it functions about as it should.").
51. Most of those who argue that the labor market ensures worker autonomy are aca-
demics (including the author of the quotation in the preceeding footnote). Because I imag-
ine that all of them value academic freedom, I would be interested in their responses to the
following: Academics presently have considerable control over the courses they teach and
the subjects on which they do research. Suppose this control were withdrawn. University
administrators would dictate which courses were taught, the content of those courses, the
manner of instruction, the way in which faculty related to each other and to students, the
subjects on which research could be conducted, the methodology to be used, how and where
the results of that research could be published, etc. Faculty still would retain the right to
quit their jobs and look for others (though here the analogy becomes flawed, because the
labor market for professors is different from that for manual workers). How many academ-
ics would view the hypothetical situation as equivalent to their present working conditions?
How many would gladly exchange the latter for the former? That few would be eager to do
so is suggested by the outrage most law teachers have voiced about the law school of Oral
Roberts University, which requires faculty to sign a code of honor acknowledging Jesus
Christ as the one true savior and agreeing to follow in his footsteps. See L.A. Times, July 4,
1981, § I, at 27; id. Aug. 13, 1981, § I, at 15.
52. Even this assumes something approaching full employment, whereas the present of-
ficial rate of unemployment is 9% and rising, and the rate of unemployment among certain
categories of the population, such as minority youth, is 30-40%. Furthermore, job mobility
is hardly identical to risk mobility. Cf. Settle & Weisbrod, supra note 18, at 293 (low-skilled,
low-wage workers have highjob mobility).
53. If we had faith in the labor market there would be no reason to hold employers
liable for employee injuries at all - indeed, to do so would incur unnecessary transaction
costs. Cf. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960). Employees would
simply bargain for a risk premium as part of their wages and then insure against loss; if the
premium were too high employers would choose to make the work safer. Yet we do not
allow this: employers are liable under workers' compensation laws and workers cannot as-
sume the risk of injury at work. This suggests that even capitalism is uneasy about the total
commodification of safety.
54. This is so even though safety is a mandatory subject of bargaining under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. See Fibre Bd. Paper Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222
(1964); NLRB v. Gulf Power, 384 F.2d 822, 824 (5th Cir. 1967).
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note that "optimum conditions" rarely exist: three-quarters of Ameri-
can workers are unorganized, and many of the unions that represent
the remaining quarter are weak or unrepresentative of worker de-
mands, or both." Capitalism makes workers the same kind of an offer
about the level of risk that the Godfather made his adversaries - an
offer that can't be refused.
Consumers and victims of pollution also are presented with the
illusion of choice in lieu of control. They can choose only to buy more
or less dangerous products and services, to live in more or less polluted
environments. But under conditions of oligopoly or monopoly choos-
ing the capitalist from which to buy is even less satisfactory as a surro-
gate for control over safety;56 and consumers are even less organized
and more ignorant about risk than workers.'" Capitalism and profes-
sionalism (its equivalent in the realm of services)58 foster dependence
by consumers, thereby. denying them the freedom to choose not to con-
sume. Whether consumption is ostensibly voluntary or constraint is
more readily apparent (as when people are forced to "consume" pollu-
tion), the terms of the transaction are dictated by capital, and courts
will enforce it.59
Autonomy requires knowledge as well as volition; yet capital sys-
tematically withholds knowledge of the nature and magnitude of the
risks it inflicts.' In order to retain control and maintain hierarchy,
55. The individual worker lacks adequate resources to make a thorough investigation
into the safety of his working conditions. See Settle & Weisbrod, supra note 18, at 290. But
there also is no correlation between the degree of unionization in an industry and its safety
record. Id. at 295-97. One reason may be that American unions have been very slow to
bargain over health and safety issues. See D. BERMAN, supra note 16, ch. 5. Furthermore,
individuals in unionized industries rarely grieve over those issues. See C. GERSUNY, supra
note 5, at 122.
An example of worker powerlessness is the four women at an American Cyanamid
plant in West Virginia who agreed to be sterilized in order to save their jobs, which involved
exposure to toxic chemicals that might endanger a fetus. One 26-year-old woman stated: "It
was not a joint decision on our part. We made the decisions individually, and we did it
because we were afraid." N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1979, at A-21, col. 1.
56. See, e.g., R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
57. Evidence shows that the general population systematically underestimates the risks
to which they are exposed. A recent survey revealed that 18% of the respondents believed
there was a one in ten chance of being in an accident during the following year, and 50%
thought the probability was less than one in three hundred. The actual probability was one
in five. TEKNEKRON, INC., 1978 SURVEY OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF HIGHWAY SAFETY
(1978).
58. M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977).
59. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700
(1972) (economic power of developer sufficient to force relocation of feed lot - and the
court set the price).
60. Thorne Auchter, the businessman Reagan appointed as director of OSHA, quickly
withdrew a pamphlet informing cotton industry workers of the dangers of brown lung, see
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capital opposes legislation granting workers the right to know the dan-
gers they confront; in one recent case it was alleged that Johns-
Manville concealed the hazards associated with asbestos and even de-
nied employees access to their own medical records, which contained
diagnoses of progressive asbestosis.6 ' Capital opposes labeling require-
In These Times, Apr. 22, 1981, at 4, and subsequently withdrew a film, Can't Take No More,
about the history of the job safety and health movement from the industrial revolution to the
present, see L.A. Times, Apr. 28, 1981, § II, at 1. One of the first acts of the Department of
Labor after Reagan's inauguration was to withdraw a regulation promulgated by the Carter
administration that would have guaranteed workers the right to know workplace hazards,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1981, § I, at A-1, col. 6.
When I wrote to the Department to protest the withdrawal, I received an answer
from Bailus Walker, Jr., Director of the Health Standards Programs of OSHA (May 7, 1981)
in which he stated that OSHA was "currently in the process of reviewing options and deter-
mining an appropriate course for future action." He was particularly concerned about "the
definition of what constitutes a hazardous substance" and "the kind of information that
should appear on the label." A year later, OSHA apparently still is unable to resolve "the
complex issues associated with the promulgation of such a standard."
Consumers fare no better. In a lawsuit brought by the widower of a woman who
allegedly died from toxic shock syndrome (TSS) after using Rely tampons, the plaintiff of-
fered in evidence several of the manufacturer's internal memoranda. A month before the
woman's death, one such memo stated:
If a clear correlation between tampons and TSS is established and if the mortal-
ity rate on [sic] TSS increases, the tampon business could be in real trouble. However,
it does not appear that this will happen.
I don't think we should put Rely in neutral for the next year or two - we have
momentum behind our brand that we will never have again.
Other documents showed that Proctor & Gamble knew at the time of the above memoran-
dum that a woman using Rely tampons had died, apparently from toxic shock syndrome.
Two weeks after they learned this, however, a memo told company executives that, if asked
about TSS, they should respond: "We have never been aware of a serious illness involving
our product." Evening Outlook (Santa Monica, Cal.), Apr. 13, 1982, at A-2.
61. Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612
P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980); see also L.A. Times, Aug. 24, 1981, § I, at 2; id., Dec. 1,
1981, § I, at 3.
In a recent study of workers who had been exposed to asbestos at the Long Beach
Naval Shipyard prior to 1961, 59% of a sample of 310 male workers had asbestosis; 25% of a
sample of 40 women who worked in the shipyards briefly during the Second World War had
the disease; and 10% of 305 relatives of those workers also had it, though they had no direct
contact with the workplace. Nevertheless, the director of industrial relations at the shipyard
continued to insist: "The shipyard is probably one of the safest environments in which an
employee can work. I would say this environment is safer than being out in the normal
community." L.A. Times, Oct. 3, 1981, § II, at I.
Members of the Alabama Brown Lung Association recently charged that their em-
ployers had deleted or changed information in their medical records in order to conceal lung
damage. Clearly these employers do not keep careful records. When Robert Lewis re-
quested his from the Opelika Manufacturing Corp., they contained nothing about the results
of his five tests for pulmonary function, but they did indicate that he had experienced men-
strual bleeding and was pregnant. In These Times, Mar. 24-30, 1982, at 5.
Although the dangers of asbestos were known by 1931, see D. BERMAN, supra note
16, at 2, employers did little or nothing to protect workers until the 1970s. Thus commenta-
tors estimate that there will be 8,000-10,000 asbestos-related deaths and diseases a year from
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ments that might allow consumers to exercise informed choice.6 2 It
tries hard, and with considerable success, to conceal the damage it does
to the environment.63 And the capitalist state, which is a major em-
ployer of labor, purveyor of services, and environmental polluter, also
insists upon unilateral control and refuses to disclose the risks it
creates. 64
The choice that capitalism offers is actually a mystification of con-
straint concealed in the clothes of contract.65 For it is capital that sets
now until the end of the century (because the symptoms take 10-30 years to develop), which
will generate legal claims in excess of $80 billion. MacAvoy, You, Too, Will Payfor Asbesto-
sis, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1982, § 3, at F-3, col. 1.
62. An outstanding example, of course, is the opposition of the tobacco industry to any
warning about the dangers of smoking. See T. WHITESIDE, SELLING DEATH: CIGARETrE
SMOKING AND ADVERTISING (1971). The Reagan administration recently withdrew a
Treasury Department Regulation that would have required liquor manufacturers to disclose
the contents of their products to consumers. Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1981, § 1, at 12, col. 4.
Richard Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services, has ordered the Food and
Drug Administration to drop a proposed requirement that drug manufacturers give consum-
ers of 10 commonly prescribed drugs brochures describing their proper usages and side ef-
fects, L.A. Times, § I, at 2, although a contemporaneous study showed that 70% of those who
received such leaflets in a pilot project read them, D. KANOUSE, S. BERRY, B. HAYES-ROTH,
W. ROGERS & J. WINKLER, INFORMING PATIENTS ABOUT DRUGS (1981).
63. For example, institutional advertisements insistently argue that strip mining of coal
and deep sea oil drilling actually enhance the environment. Weyerhaeuser calls itself The
Tree Growing Company. And a demolition contractor recently mixed eight truckloads of
asbestos with other wood and concrete debris in order to disguise it and then dumped it in a
landfill unsuitable for hazardous waste. L.A. Times, July 9, 1981, § II, at 7.
64. The Supreme Court has ruled that the federal government need not disclose the
location of nuclear bombs that may expose nearby residents to dangerous radiation. Wein-
berger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 102 S. Ct. 197 (1981); see also L.A.
Times, Jan. 19, 1982, § I, at 2 (neighbors of Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station seeking
federal district court order that Navy disclose whether nuclear weapons are stored there);
L.A. Times, May 18, 1982, § II, at 1 (Judge Hauk dismissed the suit, stating: "Why should
[the Navy] have to tell our enemies what's going on? Keep them Guessin [sic]. . . . That
keeps the public guessing, too, but so what?").
A pending lawsuit seeks to demonstrate that the Atomic Energy Commission sup-
pressed information that might have connected the deaths of several thousand sheep in Utah
in 1953 with fallout from atomic weapons tests in Nevada. In the original action brought by
the sheepowners 25 years ago, the government testified: "We do not know of anyone con-
nected with the Atomic Energy Commission's investigation of the alleged sheep losses who
has now concluded that radioactive fallout was a possible or probable cause of the injury to
the sheep." But in fact two Army investigators had made that causal connection, and one
still adheres to his opinion. The results of experiments at Hanford, Washington, revealing
similar symptoms were withheld. And a former county extension agent who had helped
AEC scientists examine the sheep said that two of them had told him they were ordered to
rewrite reports linking the animals' deaths to radioactivity. L.A. Times, May 16, 1982, § I, at
6; Evening Outlook (Santa Monica, Cal.), May 11, 1982, at A-5.
65. As both Pashukanis and a number of recent commentators have shown, this is an
extension to legal rights of the commodity form that capitalism imposes on labor and liberal
democracy imposes on citizens. The subject of the legal right is told that he is free because,
even though he experiences constraint, he is formally empowered to seek redress for inva-
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the terms of the contract. The paradigm of the autonomous individual
is the consumer. Yet many purchases are either necessities or con-
sumed involuntarily. Often there is little variation in the levels of risk
among "competing" products and services, and the purchaser has no
control over the nature of the risk, other than by participating in the
(largely fictitious) "free" market. When the worker incurs risk by sell-
ing his labor power to the capitalist, the commodity form that the trans-
action assumes becomes doubly mystifying. The worker has no choice
whether to engage in that transaction; and the package of wages, bene-
fits, and risk is not a fair return for the worker's labor power.66 To
characterize the transaction as a free exchange of commodities equates
individual decisions about what risks to incur in the expenditure of dis-
cretionary income and leisure time - e.g., whether to go hang gliding
or read a book - with decisions about what kind of risk to experience
at work - e.g., whether to be an accountant or a miner. The former
choice may be real; the latter is not. It is noteworthy that those in low-
risk occupations - law professors, for instance - defend their privi-
leged safety by reference to the freedom of choice they experience
themselves and therefore impute to others. Those who incur high risks,
by contrast, perceive both their work and its concomitant risks as
coerced.67
B. Equality
Risk is part of life. Even if people were not subjected to dangers
controlled by others, they still would not be able to eliminate risk alto-
gether. The second principle underlying a socialist approach to risk,
therefore, is that those risks we collectively choose to encounter ought
to be shared equally. But whereas the principle of autonomy elicits
support from a broad political spectrum (even if some of the enthusi-
asm may be superficial or hypocritical), the principle of equality is
much more controversial. Yet it, too, can mobilize diverse sources of
allegiance.
One of these is John Rawls's first principle of justice: "each person
is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible
sions of that right. See E. PASHUKANIS: SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW (P.
Beirne & R. Sharlet eds. 1979); Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the
Relative Autonomy of the Law, 11 L. & Soc'Y REV. 571 (1977); Jessop, On Recent Marxist
Theories of Law, the State, and Juridico-Political Ideology, 8 INT'L J. Soc. L. 339 (1980);
Warrington, Pashukanis and the Commodity Form Theory, 9 INT'L J. Soc. L. 1 (1981).
66. Young, Marx on Bourgeois Law, 2 RESEARCH L. & SOC. 133 (1979).
67. WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 47, at 13-17.
[VOL. 41
A SOCIALIST APPROACH TO RISK
with a similar liberty for others."6 As I will argue below, freedom
from risk is one of the most basic of liberties. Furthermore, it is partic-
ularly difficult to claim that "an unequal distribution of [risk]. . .is to
the advantage of the least favored."69 George Fletcher's proposed the-
ory of tort reflects a similar principle: "a victim has a right to recover
for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and different in order
from those created by the victim and imposed on the defendant - in
short, for injuries resulting from nonreciprocal risks."7 Fletcher predi-
cates liability on nonreciprocal risks because he views the infliction of
such risks as morally reprehensible.
A very different philosophical tradition, marxism, directs its criti-
cism at the primary sources of unequal risk - the division of labor and
private property. The previous section already has argued that private
ownership of capital deprives all who are not capitalists of autonomous
control over risk. Bertell Ollman, paraphrasing Marx, writes:
The division of labor whereby people do only one kind of work
and rely upon others to do whatever else is necessary to keep them
alive is a more inclusive social expression of man's alienated pro-
ductive activity ...
The further it develops, that is the smaller the task assigned to
each individual, the more alienation approximates the full-blown
form it assumes in capitalism.7'
Not only does the division of labor alienate men and women from their
labor, it also is related to both the emergence of the class structure of
capitalism and the growth of private property.
Division of labor and private property are . ..identical expres-
sions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activ-
ity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of the
activity.
. ..The division of labor implies from the outset the division
of the conditions of labor, of tools and materials, and thus the
splitting up of accumulated capital among different owners, and
thus, also, the division between capital and labor, and different
68. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971); see also WORK IN AMERICA, supra note
47, at 302-03.
69. WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 47, at 303.
70. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1972).
Fletcher explicitly reserves judgment on whether his analysis should apply to situations in
which the victim and causal actor are in a contractual relationship. Id. at 544 n.24, 546 n.38,
548 n.43. But I see no reason to exclude such situations.
71. B. OLLMAN, ALIENATION: MARX'S CONCEPTION OF MAN IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY
158-59 (2d ed. 1976).
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forms of property itself.72
Because class differences determine the risks that members of each
class experience, as both producers and consumers, Maoism con-
demned the division of labor and sought to eliminate not only class but
also the differences between headwork and handwork," and between
city and country.7 4 The second of Mao's two participations therefore
exhorted technicians and cadres to join in the manual labor for which
they were providing scientific and political guidance."
But if the principle of equality is consistent with varied political
philosophies, its claims are just as visible in daily thought and action.
Most people feel that physical well-being - our own and that of those
we love - is the highest good. We express that belief in numerous
mundane ways: when we toast someone's health or inquire about the
health of those we meet; in the order of blessings in the phrase
"healthy, wealthy, and wise." Because people take their health less for
granted as they grow older and consequently value it more, they say:
"At least I've got my health; that's all that matters." The extraordinary
amount of money that Americans spend on health care offers further
evidence.76 Indeed, when we learn that a specific individual is suffering
from a rare illness or is threatened by a transitory catastrophe we are
willing to spend almost unlimited resources to save the victim.77 Simi-
larly, we feel some collective responsibility to ensure that every mem-
ber of society receives at least minimal health care: most advanced
capitalist nations (except our own) and all socialist states provide
health services to their citizens, and many contribute foreign aid to im-
prove health in other countries. Even the United States, one of the
most backward regimes in the capitalist world, provides health care to
the very young, the very old, and the very poor. Capitalism thus distin-
72. K. MARX, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 22, 65 (1942), quoted in B. OLLMAN, supra note
71, at 158, 160.
73. Sohn-Rethal, Mental and Manual Labour in Marxism, in SITUATING MARX 44 (P.
Walton & S. Hall eds. 1972).
74. C. BETTELHEIM, CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN
CHINA: CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 78, 87 (1974); Whyte,
supra note 34.
75. See Whyte, supra note 34, at 152.
76. In 1980, Americans spent $247 billion on health services. Gibson & Waldo, National
Health Expenditures, 1980, 3 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. I (Sept. 1981). In 1981 they
spent $274 billion, according to the Federation of American Hospitals. Evening Outlook
(Santa Monica, Cal.), Mar. 25, 1982, at A-6.
77. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 8, at 25 & n.3. One reason we do this may be that
knowledge of the identity of the person at risk shortcircuits the social distance that ordina-
rily separates us from the anonymous victims in our mass society, forcing us to recognize the
victim's essential humanity. Once we do this we are compelled to treat all victims as equal
and to reject the notion that some are more worth saving than others.
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guishes health from income or wealth: there is a right to the former (if
one that is imperfectly protected), even though there is no entitlement
to the latter. The state takes custody of children whose parents abuse
or neglect them; it does not interfere when parents simply reproduce
their class position in the next generation.
Thus far I have talked about the preeminent value of health and
our commitment to setting a floor below which no one may fall. But
the argument for equal allocation of risk can be made more directly.
We insist that certain high but unavoidable risks be shared: universal
military service is the clearest example.7 8 We feel that if anyone must
be threatened with loss of life or serious injury, everyone should be (or
at least should stand an equal chance of being threatened, as in the
draft lottery). Having embraced that principle, we emphatically reject
the practice, common in nineteenth-century Europe and even in our
own Civil War, by which the privileged could buy exemptions from, or
substitutes for, their military service.7 9 We recognize, of course, that
even now some men are able to translate social and economic advan-
tage into medical, educational, occupational, or other deferments;" ° but
many are critical of the unequal burden of the draft. Today we are
even uncomfortable with the categorical exclusion of women;8' and
other countries, such as Israel, make military service truly universal,
78. Our responses to natural disasters - floods, earthquakes, fires, blizzards, hurricanes,
tornados - as well as to man-made tragedies - crime and war - also reveal we are predis-
posed to equalize risk.
79. When conscription was introduced in the North in 1863 draftees were allowed to
purchase an exemption for $300. This created such anger that it led to three days of rioting
in New York, leaving an estimated 400 to 2,000 people dead, 50 buildings destroyed, and
$2,000,000 in damage. As a result the cash commutation eventually was repealed. Never-
theless, 99 federal registrars were killed or injured during the first four months of conscrip-
tion. And of the 1.3 million drafted, all but 46,347 who served were volunteers who
accepted bounties or were coerced by local pressures. See 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA
Conscription 541, 544 (1963); 20 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA New York, N.Y. 214b, 232
(1963). The South, which had adopted the draft a year earlier, followed pure market princi-
ples and allowed draftees to purchase substitutes, who might charge as much as $10,000 in
Confederate currency. This, too, engendered severe class antagonism and subsequently was
repealed. R. CURRENT, T. WILLIAMS, F. FREIDEL & W. BROWNLEE, THE ESSENTIALS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 152-53, 156-57 (2d ed. 1976).
If we still believed that the market should allocate the risks of warfare we simply
would increase the pay and benefits offered volunteers until we obtained a military force of
sufficient size and quality. That we have not done so during any war in the present century
and that both Democratic and Republican presidents have maintained compulsory peace-
time registration after a brief flirtation with an all-volunteer army, suggests that we have
strong doubts about both the efficiency and the morality of a market mechanism for this
purpose.
80. L. BASKIR & W. STRAUSS, CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCES: THE DRAFT, THE WAR,
AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION (1978).
81. But see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Provisions of
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although women still do not engage in combat.8 2 Our discomfort with
inequality of risk is intensified when the distribution of risk is isomor-
phic with other suspect ascriptive categories, such as race, class, gender,
and nationality. 3 Thus many are uneasy about the overrepresentation
of the poor and ethnic minorities in both our conscript army during the
Vietnam War and our volunteer army today. 4 And our willingness to
provide foreign aid and to contribute to charities is at least partly at-
tributable to our belief that the likelihood of suffering malnutrition or
illness should not turn on accidents of birth.8 5
Our interest in promoting a proper distribution of risk also is re-
vealed by our refusal to allow risk to be allocated solely by the mar-
ket.86 The criminal law prohibits many actions threatening bodily
the Military Selective Service Act authorizing the President to require the registration for
possible military service of males but not females are not unconstitutional).
82. Kempster, To Israeli Women, Equality is an Old Myth, Male Domination the Reality,
L.A. Times, Jan. 21, 1982, § I, at 16.
83. The same principle of equality of burden underlies the one other service the United
States requires of its citizens: jury duty. Granted that all are required to serve because the
Constitution guarantees a trial by one's peers. Still, we also feel that the sacrifice of time
ought to be borne equally, and we find suspect the claims advanced by some that jury duty is
more onerous for them because their time is more valuable (if we do not always reject the
argument). See Alker, Hosticka & Mitchell, Jury Selection as a Biased Social Process, I 1 L.
& Soc'Y REV. 9 (1976); Levine & Schweber-Koren, Jury Selection in Erie County" Changing
a Sexist System, II L. & Soc'Y REV. 43 (1976).
84. L. BASKIR & W. STRAUSS, supra note 80.
85. Our commitment to equality of risk is tested more pointedly by the actions of Ameri-
can enterprises that seek to export to third-world countries risks that we have decided are
unacceptable at home. See T. MELLER, POOR HEALTH, RICH PROFITS: MULTINATIONAL
DRUG COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD (1977); D. WEIR & M. SCHAPIRO, CIRCLE OF
POISON (1980); Shue, Exporting Hazards, in BOUNDARIES: NATIONAL AUTHORITY AND ITS
LIMITS (P. Brown & H. Shue eds. 1981).
Statistics on the cost to save an additional life in different social settings dramatically
reveal this inequality. One commentator estimated that it would cost an additional $22
million to do so in an American coal mine but only $100 to do so by immunization in
Indonesia. Another study reports that England spends $10,000 to prevent life-endangering
accidents to agricultural workers but $20 million to save high-rise apartment dwellers. What
is the Dollar Value ofa Human Life?, 2 UCLA THIS WEEK 1, 4 (Mar. 8-14, 1982).
86. The Reagan administration, however, may not be adverse to allowing risk to be
bought and sold. The Environmental Protection Agency recently promulgated rules that
allow a firm presently violating clean air laws to continue to pollute if it can find another
firm that exceeds its clean air requirements and buy the latter's entitlement to pollute up to
the limits of the law. L.A. Times, Dec. 17, 1981, § I, at 12. This "bubble policy" has been
extended from the few areas that already meet national standards to virtually the entire
nation. The EPA also will delegate approval of the so-called "emission trading banks" to
the states. L.A. Times, Apr. 3, 1982, § I, at 7. This is an extension of the market for tax
losses available to businesses; note that individuals (except married couples) cannot pool
their incomes and thereby average them for tax purposes.
Even those who staunchly advocate cost-benefit analysis as the necessary basis for
regulatory efforts to cure market failure repudiate it when there are distinct groups that
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integrity, and individuals are not allowed to consent to crimes, much
less sell their right to be protected from such injuries.87 We have a
large regulatory apparatus designed to protect workers, consumers, and
others who cannot waive those protections in return for a job, higher
wages, cheaper goods or services, or other benefits. We do not allow
people to sell themselves into slavery. These beliefs are so fundamental
that they rarely are tested and thus rarely exhibited. Yet when they are
challenged our reaction is immediate and strong. The Los Angeles
Times recently reported that newspapers in Brazil routinely carry ad-
vertisements from people offering to sell their eyes or kidneys and that
several people have died of blood loss after selling too much blood to
commercial blood banks.88 This story elicited universal horror at the
notion that bodily integrity might be treated as a commodity to be
bought and sold. Yet what is the difference between accepting a
probability of illness or injury at work as part of the sale of one's labor
power, and selling a specific organ? If we feel that all have an equal
obligation to donate blood or organs to those in need,89 do we not have
an equal obligation to share other risks?
According to capitalism, we do not. Notwithstanding the presence
of contradictory strands, bourgeois ideology as a whole does not en-
dorse equality of risk.90 Liberalism, the political philosophy of capital-
ism, advocates equal opportunity, not result. Indeed, capitalism
demands that results be unequal in order to motivate individuals to
maximum effort in the competitive struggle for personal advancement.
In the present context this means that each will strive to minimize the
risks to which he is exposed, usually increasing the risks that others
must incur. Liberalism explains the resulting distribution of rewards
(and disadvantages) as an accurate reflection of individual worth - a
meritocracy - typically by reference to a system of education and cre-
suffer disproportionate costs or enjoy unique benefits. See Adams, . . And How Muchfor
Your Grandmother?, 6 ENV'T & PLAN. 619 (1974).
87. However, we tend to be hypocritical about enforcement when, for instance, we pun-
ish women who sell their bodies but not the men who buy them. See J. WALKOWITZ, PROS-
TITUTION AND VICTORIAN SOCIETY (1980).
88. Freed, Desperation: Selling Your Eye, Kidney, L.A. Times, Sept. 10, 1981, § I, at 1.
89. Cf. R. TITMUss, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POL-
icy (1971) (relating societal characteristics to duty of altruism).
90. Capitalist tort law, for instance, takes it for granted that consumers are entitled to
whatever level of safety they can buy. A cheap used car need not be as safe as an expensive
new one - indeed, the brakes may fail the day it is bought and still courts will not find it
defective. See Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc., 258 Or. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971); cf. Cooper v.
Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (owner of premises may have lower duty of care to
social guest if owner is poor and unable to repair); Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (physician's duty of care in medical malpractice case may depend on available
facilities, which in turn are a function of patient's ability to pay).
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dentials. Thus differential exposure to risk is justified on the ground
that, though all people are valuable, some are more valuable than
others.9" Those who are privileged under the system by being pro-
tected from harm clearly come to think of themselves as more deserv-
ing. When I have advanced my ideas to law school colleagues (who are
exposed to minimal risks as both producers and consumers) most re-
spond with incredulity and outrage. It is "obvious" to them that a fa-
mous violinist should not have his hands endangered by a punch press;
it clearly is "better" that this risk be inflicted on an unskilled worker
who is readily replaceable and who uses his hands, outside work, only
to repair his car, throw around a football, and lift a glass of beer.
Law under capitalism expresses, and thereby reinforces and imple-
ments, these judgments about differential value. It takes the income
loss of a victim as the measure of the victim's worth; it further distin-
guishes between manual workers (who are more likely to be injured on
the job and thereby relegated to the inadequate remedy of workers'
compensation) and others (who are likely to be injured, if at all, outside
work and thus entitled to much more generous tort remedies). Capital-
ist law discriminates in this fashion because capitalism views workers
as pure labor power. By making it cheap to injure some and expensive
to injure others, capitalist law ensures that risk will be unequally dis-
tributed. This distribution, by definition, then becomes the "efficient"
allocation of risk, the allocation that bourgeois legal theoreticians en-
dorse because they are concerned with efficiency, not distribution.
But even in societies, like Sweden, that seek to equalize the distri-
91. Recent discussions of civil defense and nuclear warfare have highlighted the differ-
ential values placed on human lives. Some have suggested that the elderly be used to clean
up radioactivity after an attack because they have fewer years in which to contract cancer
and no longer are reproducing. The director of the Los Angeles County Department of
Military and Veterans Affairs proposed a solution to the problem of relocating the 18.5
million urban population of Southern California to rural areas in the event of a nuclear war:
[I]t is my opinion that the pre-selection of priority evacuees according to their value to
the society that would survive the nuclear strike is absolutely essential.
High priority evacuees would include the young and physically fit, skilled spe-
cialists of all sciences, trades, occupations, and a well-balanced labor force.
On the low end of the priorities would be the elderly, the infirm, the unskilled,
the unessential, and those whose presence in the relocation area would serve only to
place a burden on the survivors.
Kendall, "Noah's Ark" Theoryfor County Nuclear Attack Proposed, L.A. Times, May 12,
1982, § II, at 1.
Capitalist law typically values life by measuring discounted future earnings (DFE).
This can result in such disparities as the following: $103,935 for an infant, $244,155 for a
young adult, and $31,700 for a senior citizen. See B. FAIGIN, 1975 SOCIETAL COST OF MO-
TOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 5 (1976). One study calculated the DFE of an 85-year-old black
woman at $123. J. HAMILTON & S. SCOTCHMER, ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
IMPLEMENTING AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLANS IN CALIFORNIA 134 (1979).
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bution of advantage in other respects, the allocation of risk through the
labor market produces a strong correlation between socioeconomic sta-
tus and the level of danger encountered on the job.92 This is inevitable
- no matter how enthusiastically a capitalist state embraces welfare
principles, no matter how far it goes along the road toward social de-
mocracy, workers and capitalists both retain the legal right to buy and
sell risk and must engage in such transactions. Some approach this
market in risk with greater resources than others. Such antecedent ad-
vantage can be exchanged for a low-risk work environment and low-
risk consumer goods and services.
Welfare capitalism and social democracy can soften the rigors of a
pure laissez-faire approach to risk. Regulation can set a floor that for-
bids certain extreme risks. But this leaves untouched the vast inequali-
ties that remain above that floor and indeed legitimates them by
suggesting that what is not regulated represents an acceptable level of
inequality. The state could ignore wealth in compensating injuries,
thereby achieving equality of remedy. But though this would remove
the strong incentive generated by capitalist law to place disproportion-
ate risk on those whom it is cheapest to compensate, it would not equal-
ize the incidence of risk, for those who could buy out of danger by
virtue of their superior wealth, income, status or education still would
do so.93 Such a reform would equalize the cure but not the disease.
For welfare capitalism and social democracy preserve, and depend
upon, the division of labor and the individualization of rewards, which,
as I argued earlier, entail an unequal distribution of risk in both pro-
duction and consumption.
92. Karlsson, Industrial Democracy in Sweden, in WORKERS' CONTROL: A READER ON
LABOR AND SOCIAL CHANGE 176, 186 (G. Hunnius, G. Garson & J. Case eds. 1973). The
strength of this correlation increases as the labor market is "freed" from government control.
President Reagan, in his State of the Union address on January 27, 1982, proposed to create
"free enterprise" zones in American inner cities. It is said that he intended to recommend
that Congress relieve businesses who invest in those zones of the obligation to comply with
minimum wage laws and OSHA regulations. Evening Outlook (Santa Monica, Cal.), Jan.
26, 1982, at A-7. Thus minority youth would have the "opportunity" to encounter risks
from which all other American workers are protected, at wages below those earned by any
other American worker. In response to criticism by labor, Reagan subsequently revised this
proposal, eliminating changes in health and safety laws and preserving the minimum wage.
L.A. Times, Mar. 24, 1982, § I, at 17.
93. Similarly those who are able to do so buy out of the public sector wherever it pres-
ently provides services, e.g., public transportation, education, pensions, the mail service, po-
lice, campgrounds, and legal and medical services. This, of course, is encouraged by the new
right. In England, 3 million people, or 6% of the population, now are covered by private
health insurance. The number of private hospital beds is growing at the rate of 20% a year,
whereas the number of public hospital beds declined by 15% during the last decade.




C. Autonomy and Equality
These two principles must be realized together, not in isolation
from each other. One person should not pursue autonomous control
over his own risk by seeking to inflict unequal risk on another, and risk
should not be equalized by depriving anyone of autonomous control
over his own risks. Are these principles in conflict? I do not think so.9
4
There are two possible tensions. First, one person might claim that
autonomy meant striving to reduce his own risk by increasing that of
another. I believe that such behavior expresses a false or unsocialized
autonomy because it denies the autonomy of the other person. Do we
act this way toward those whose autonomy we recognize and respect,
i.e., those we love? Second, one person might wish autonomously to
increase his own risk beyond that experienced by others and therefore
view equalization of risk as a violation of that autonomy. I believe this
possibility is largely a figment of the imagination of bourgeois econo-
mists, whose animus against paternalism takes the form of a solicitude
for the freedom of others (never they themselves) to incur high risks. I
do not deny that people presently accept extraordinary risks, either be-
cause they have no choice (they can find no other jobs, they can afford
no other goods, services, or places to live) or because they are striving
for the rewards that capitalism confers on others without exacting a
similar cost.9 5 But in neither instance is the individual acting autono-
mously. Construction workers may choose to assemble the superstruc-
tures of skyscrapers, but surely they prefer to do so with the minimum
possible risk of falling to their deaths; certainly no one chooses to work
with carcinogenic chemicals because he is risk preferential. Autonomy
is not ensured by eliminating political restraints. That is the great myth
of liberalism. Economic, social, and psychological constraints are just
as important and often more powerful. Thus true autonomy, for one-
self and for others, not only is consistent with equality of risk but actu-
ally requires it.
In the following two sections I will explore the implications of
these principles for the allocation of risk in the spheres of production
and reproduction (both voluntary and involuntary consumption, i.e.,
94. Put see A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADE-OFF (1975).
95. It is essential to distinguish sharply between risks encountered at work and in lei-
sure-time activities. I readily grant that people voluntarily incur numerous risks, many of
them extreme, in their recreational pastimes: skiing, mountain climbing, scuba diving, even
car driving. I agree that it is important to preserve the freedom to engage in such activities.
But even here self-destructive behavior generally affects others - families, friends, social
units that feel an obligation to care for the ill or injured - and therefore these have the right
to try to persuade the participant not to incur the risk and perhaps even to curtail his or her
ability to do so.
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pollution). I will concentrate on the former sphere for two reasons:
reallocation of risk is more difficult to achieve there; and its attainment,
even in part, significantly will advance reallocation in the latter
sphere.96
III. RISK IN PRODUCTION
A. The Ideals of Autonomous Control and Equal Exposure
Significant progress toward these goals requires a total restructur-
ing of the relations of production - the displacement of capitalism by
decentralized socialism. Workers must have the fullest information
possible about the risks to which they are exposed. They must control
those risks, which means they must control the productive process. But
workers can make correct decisions about how much risk to accept only
if they also have the right to control and enjoy the benefits of their
productive activity, which have to be balanced against those risks. This
requires worker control over the entire enterprise, since production,
sales, distribution, financing, wages, allocation of profits, etc. obviously
affect and are affected by decisions regarding risk. Control, in turn,
implies undiluted ownership; it would be unrealistic to expect those
who presently stand to gain or lose from these decisions (i.e., capital-
ists) to refrain from seeking to influence them. Anything less than full
worker control (e.g., worker participation in safety committees or even
in management broadly defined) is inadequate, for it still allows those
exempt from risk to have a say in determining the risks that others
must endure.97 On the other hand, ownership without control also is
unacceptable, especially if ownership is only partial: it is not sufficient
that employees own some stock in the corporation. Control similarly
must be more than a paper right: every worker must not only be enti-
tled to participate, but must participate in fact.98
96. Accidental deaths and injuries at work were estimated to have caused personal in-
jury losses of $17.8 billion in 1976, compared with $24.7 billion for automobile accidents
and $6.3 billion for home injuries (all excluding property damage), NATIONAL SAFETY
COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 2-8 (1977). It is important to note that the first figure omits
occupational disease, which separately has been estimated to cause 300,000 new cases of
disability and 100,000 deaths a year. P. BARTH & H. HUNT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION
AND WORK-RELATED DISEASES 15-27 (1980). It has been estimated that the total annual
cost to society of occupational injury and illness is on the order of $30-50 billion. See M.
GREEN & N. WAITZMAN, BUSINESS WAR ON THE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFITS OF
FEDERAL HEALTH/SAFETY ENFORCEMENT 96 (rev. 2d ed. 1981).
97. Johnson & Whyte, The Mondragon System of Worker Production Cooperatives, 31
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 18, 25 (1977); Silver, Worker Management: .4 Power-Dialectic
Framework, 8 Soc. WORK & OCCUPATIONS 145 (1981); Steams, supra note 18, at 15-18.
98. A recent study of worker ownership in the United States revealed that it usually is
limited to a minority interest and, even then, often has no voting rights. See ECONOMIC
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Risk must be equally distributed. This is a logical corollary of col-
lective control, for otherwise some of those who participate in deciding
the kind and magnitude of risks will be subjecting others to risks they
do not experience themselves - a violation of the principle of auton-
omy. Equalization of risk requires reduction in the division of labor,
job sharing, and job rotation. I recognize the numerous obstacles such
changes must overcome under capitalist relations of production, and I
deal with these in some detail below. Here let me just note some of the
issues that must be addressed: How will risk equalization affect effi-
ciency and productivity? How will it be viewed by the workers in-
volved, both those who gain new skills and those who suffer new
constraints on the extent to which they can exercise skills they have
worked hard to acquire?99 Is it sufficient to redistribute risk (and work)
within each enterprise, or should workers be rotated among enterprises
or even between industries? A concomitant of the redistribution of
tasks and the elimination of distinctions between workers and manag-
ers/owners may be the equalization of income from work, because
many of the justifications for inequality will disappear. How will this
change from individual to collective incentives affect work behavior?'
B. The Impact of Capitalism on the Allocation of Risk
Some pre-capitalist relations of production respected both princi-
ples of risk allocation.' The farmer and the craftsman worked au-
tonomously, though the market for their goods and services (not their
labor power) affected the nature and kind of risk they experienced. Al-
though there was division of labor, it was social (by craft) rather than
detailed (by task) and therefore increased the skills of those who spe-
cialized. o2 All who engaged in a given trade encountered similar risks,
though of course there were differences in the dangerousness of each
occupation. These relations of production persisted during the early
phases of capitalism. Under the system of manufactures and through
the practices of putting-out and subcontracting work to skilled
DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, EMPLOYEE OWNER-
SHIP: EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN (ESOP) (1978); see also Woodworth, Forms of
Employee Ownershio and Workers' Control, 8 Soc. WORK & OCCUPATIONS 195 (1981).
99. Rothschild-Whitt, The Collectivist Organization.- An Alternative to Rational-Bureau-
cratic Models, 44 AM. Soc. REV. 509, 524 (1979).
100. See MacEwan, Equality and Power in Revolutionary Cuba, 20 SOCIALIST REVOLU-
TION 87, 91-94 (1974) (this also is numbered volume 4, number 2; journal since has been
retitled SOCIALIST REVIEW).
101. This obviously is not true of slave societies, nor of others to the extent that the divi-
sion of labor parallels differences of gender, ethnicity, or class.
102. H. BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 71-73 (1974).
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craftsmen - in the iron industry, for instance - workers retained con-
trol over the process and pace of production. 03
Capitalism changes all this. The technological developments asso-
ciated with capitalism are not responsible; a high level of technology is
consistent with both principles of risk allocation, 1°4 as I will try to
demonstrate below. Rather, it is capitalist relations of production that
actively undermine both ideals. Capitalism collects the previously au-
tonomous craftsmen in central workplaces in order to subordinate them
to management control."°5 It introduces the division of labor within a
specialized skill. 10 6 Whereas every craftsman necessarily analyzes his
functions into their constituent elements, capitalism separates those
subtasks and allocates them to different workers. 0 7 It thereby reduces
the level of skills to the bare minimum necessary to perform each frag-
mented motion. This allows the employer to exercise maximum con-
trol over the worker while paying the latter the lowest possible wage. 08
The result is to destroy skills, to create what Durkheim, 1°9 as well as
Marx,"10 condemned as an abnormal division of labor. Hundreds of
thousands of skilled craftsmen who emigrated from Europe to America
at the turn of the century were forced to abandon their trades and be-
come unskilled laborers, wasting immeasurable amounts of talent.'"
Such a detailed division of labor is not dictated by technological com-
plexity: all factories maintain a category of employee who can fill in
for absences in a large number of jobs.'12 Nor were all workers equally
deskilled, for reductions in the skill required to perform the large ma-
jority of tasks augmented the expertise demanded by the remainder -
in order to degrade most workers to the status of machine minders,
capitalism had to elevate a few to become highly skilled tool and die
103. Id. at 60-61; D. MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA 11-12 (1979).
104. Carson, supra note 17, at 239-44.
105. H. BRAVERMAN, supra note 102, at 65. For an overview of the impact of American
capitalism on labor, see D. GORDON, R. EDWARDS & M. REICH, SEGMENTED WORK, Di-
VIDED WORKERS: THE HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES
(1982).
106. Id. at 70-73.
107. Id. at 77; see also R. BLAUNER, ALIENATION AND FREEDOM: THE FACTORY
WORKER AND His INDUSTRY 172-73 (1964).
108. H. BRAVERMAN, supra note 102, at 79-80.
109. E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY bk. 3 (G. Simpson trans. 1933).
110. 1 K. MARX, CAPITAL 475-77 (B. Fowkes trans. 1976).
111. D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 103, at 34. This should give pause to those who claim
that the capitalist imposition of a "free" market for labor allows individuals to make opti-
mum use of their capacities. For a similar criticism, see generally K. POLANYI, THE GREAT
TRANSFORMATION (1944).
112. D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 103, at 35-36.
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cutters. 13 Both changes accentuated hierarchy within the work force,
fracturing labor solidarity and facilitating control by capital." 4
At the end of the nineteenth century, Frederick Taylor observed
the changes sketched above and formulated a coherent, influential pro-
gram for the reorganization of labor. He argued that "scientific man-
agement" required capital to revolutionize production in three ways.
First, it had to collect and systematize all that the workers knew about
the production process, for Taylor recognized that workers collectively
possessed a great deal more technical expertise than their supervisors.
Braverman calls this the dissociation of the labor process from the skills
of the workers." 5 Second, capital had to remove all brain work from
the shop and centralize it in planning - consciously divorcing head
and handwork, separating conception from execution, reducing work-
ers to the condition of obedient animals." 6 Third, it had to use its
monopoly of knowledge to control each step of the productive pro-
cess." 7 The cumulative effect of these strategies was to deny workers
any control over their working conditions (including the risks to which
they were exposed) and to create gross inequalities in the kind and de-
gree of the risks they experienced - greatest between labor and man-
agement but also large, and increasing, within the workforce.
Workers in the first half of the twentieth century did not acquiesce
passively in these forms of manipulation, exploitation, and oppression.
At first they refused to work under supervision, rejected management
production quotas, and insisted on setting their own "stints," which
they enforced against fellow workers who were tempted to overpro-
duce." 8 As unions grew stronger they unilaterally imposed their own
work rules on the production process, enforced them by strikes, and
were supported by other unions who conducted sympathy strikes." 19
Unions also opposed incentive pay, which they saw as a covert means
of undermining worker autonomy, and a few unions of skilled workers
explicitly sought control over working conditions and struck to back
their demands. 2 ° Yet if these tactics delayed and obstructed imple-
mentation of the principles of scientific managment, the latter ulti-
113. Id. at 118.
114. H. BRAVERMAN, supra note 102, at 83.
115. Id. at 112.
116. Id. at 113-14.
117. Id. at 119.
118. D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 103, at 12-13.
119. Id. at 15-16, 18.
120. Id. at 98-101, 116, 122-23; cf. C. EASTMAN, WORK ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW 94
(1910) (demand for worker ownership of dangerous enterprises advanced by early socialist
feminist).
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mately triumphed. Union militance declined, for as unions grew in size
and strength they became more bureaucratic. Union leadership, em-
phasizing the tangible material rewards of wages, hours, and fringe
benefits, conceded control over working conditions to management. 12 1
Individual resistance became less effective as the mechanism of control
shifted from personal relationships within the firm to the impersonal
mechanisms of technology (the assembly line) and bureaucracy (rules
and grievance procedures). 2 2 Some workers turned to guerilla action,
engaging in pilferage and sabotage. 123 Many voted with their feet. La-
bor turnover grew to staggering proportions: rates of 100 to 250 per-
cent a year were common, and one Ford factory in 1912-1913 had to
hire 54,000 workers to maintain a workforce of 13,000, a turnover of
416 percent!124 Absenteeism also was high. Yet if these tactics allowed
workers temporary respite from intolerable conditions, those who left
one factory had little choice but to seek work at another that was virtu-
ally indistinguishable. The low levels of skill required and the large
reserve army of unemployed allowed capital to tolerate high levels of
labor turnover. Indeed, the callous disregard of capital for worker
safety contributed to such turnover, because there were plenty of work-
ers waiting to take the place of anyone who was injured. 125
If capitalism deprives workers of control over risk and imposes
unequal risks on them, how does it justify doing so? I already have
discussed two responses - legal liability (in tort or workers' compensa-
tion), both to compensate and to control, and government regulation -
and I have argued that both are inadequate. 126 Apologists for capital-
ism offer two other justifications. The first claims that wages them-
selves are adequate remuneration for the risks workers incur. 127 I find
121. D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 103, at 26, ch. 7; see also Klare, Judicial Deradicaliza-
tion of the Wagner Act and the Origins ofModern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 265 (1978).
122. R. EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORKPLACE
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 111-29, 181-83 (1979); cf. Burawoy, Terrains of Contest.- Fac-
tory and State under Capitalism and Socialism, 58 SOCIALIST REV. 83 (1981) (critique and
revision of Edwards and Braverman).
123. D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 103, at 102.
124. Id. at 41.
125. Id. at 35-36.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 2-30; see also R. CONLEY & J. NOBLE, JR.,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORM: CHALLENGE FOR THE 80's (1980); SUPPLEMENTAL
STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS (P.
Barth ed. 1973); Thompson, State Compliance with Workmen's Compensation Recommenda-
tions, 8 POL'Y STUD. J. 417 (1979).
127. See Smith, supra note 28, at 321-22. Others have asserted that high risk is accompa-
nied by low pay. See, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973);
Steams, supra note 18, at 17.
19821
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the evidence for this insubstantial and unpersuasive. 2 ' And I think it
noteworthy that those who make the argument never seem eager to ex-
change their low-risk jobs for more dangerous ones - which presuma-
bly would pay better. But even if the correlation between risk and
salary were stronger, the worker would be confined to a choice among
jobs - a choice that is limited by the worker's background (and thus
cannot be equal) and, in any case, is not the same as control over work-
ing conditions. It is interesting that capitalist utopias that seek to dis-
pense with money - for instance by substituting hours worked as the
medium of exchange, as in B.F. Skinner's Walden Two - reproduce
both inequality and the denial of autonomy. 129 The remaining capital-
ist solution to the problem of risk is to allow workers a limited role in
decisionmaking, whether through safety representatives, labor-manage-
ment committees, participation in programs to humanize work, em-
ployee stock option plans, or even membership on the board of
directors.130 Yet in each of these schemes management retains ultimate
control and labor obtains at most a minority voice, bargaining from a
position of weakness.13 None of the reforms either confers autonomy
128. See R. SMITH, COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND HAZARDOUS WORK
(1973); McLean, Wendling & Neergaard, Compensating Wage Dferentials for Hazardous
Work. An EmpiricalAnaysis, 18 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 97 (1978); Settle & Weisbrod, supra
note 18, at 298-99; Thaler & Rosen, The Value of Saving a Lfe: Evidence from the Labor
Market, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 265 (N. Terleckyj ed. 1975); K.
Gordon, Accident Rates and Wages on U.S. Class-I Railroads (1973) (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Chicago).
Indirect evidence tending to challenge the alleged correlation between wages and
risk emerged in the recent raids by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service on
businesses suspected of employing undocumented workers. One such employer, Trees, Inc.,
of Houston, paid starting tree trimmers only $4 an hour to climb trees and cut branches near
telephone and high voltage power lines. The company vice-president admitted that the
work was hard, dangerous, physically -taxing, and complicated by bad weather, poison ivy,
and poison oak. "We have some of the worst working conditions around." The 86,000
unemployed American citizens in the greater Houston metropolitan area apparently agreed,
because he was unable to fill the 135 positions left vacant by the raids. Indeed, the Texas
Employment Commission made only 42 job referrals for the 1,105 positions vacated by
those seized. L.A. Times, May 1, 1982, § I, at 30.
Note also that the common law doctrine of respondeat superior is predicated on the
fact that wages do not reflect risk to others; for, if they did, responsibility for compensating
the victim could be placed on the employee alone.
129. B.F. SKINNER, WALDEN Two (1948); cf. R. HOURIET, GETTING BACK TOGETHER
ch. 7 (1971) (description of actual commune inspired by Skinner's book).
130. D. ZWERDLING, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY 2-8, 65-79 (1980).
131. See P. BERNSTEIN, WORKPLACE DEMOCRATIZATION: ITS INTERNAL DYNAMICS 31
(1976); see also Karlsson, supra note 92, at 182 (attempted reforms in Sweden, including
shared decisionmaking by labor and management, have provided minimum levels of secur-
ity and material well-being but not equali7ation of living standards); Mandel, The Debate on
Workers' Control, in WORKERS' CONTROL 344, 348 (G. Hunnius, G. Garson & J. Case eds.
1973) (workers' control can be accomplished by nothing short of absolute anticapitalist
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or ensures equality.
Two other proposals sometimes are advanced that would make a
more dramatic break with existing capitalist relations of production.
The first is a draft. (similar to selective service for the military) to per-
form tasks that entail particularly high risks.'32 This seems unsatisfac-
tory for several reasons. It would equalize risk only for a very small
number of jobs. Our experience with the draft does not inspire confi-
dence that even this limited obligation would be shared fairly; 33 and to
the extent that service were selective it would not be shared widely.
Nothing in the plan guarantees that those drafted would have autono-
mous control over the risks they encountered, and again the model of
the military strongly suggests otherwise.'34 Finally, the administrative
costs and loss of efficiency incurred by rotating people in and out of
such work for short periods of time would be very high. The second
alternative is nationalization. But whether this is partial, leaving all
but the most dangerous enterprises in the hands of private capital (in
which case it is no solution) or total, i.e., state capitalism, it is wholly
consistent with continuing to deny workers autonomy and exposing
them to unequal risks.' 35 What we know about nationalized industries
structural reform); Schauer, Critique of co-Determination, in WORKERS' CONTROL 210, 211
(G. Hunnius, G. Garson & J. Case eds. 1973) (co-determination in Germany contemplates
persistence and protection of the hierarchic decisionmaking structure with its concomitant
principles and social conditions).
132. S. PERRY, SAN FRANCISCO SCAVENGERS: DIRTY WORK AND THE PRIDE OF OWNER-
SHIP (1978); cf. F. MARKS, K. LESWING & B. FORTINSKY, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 288-93 (1972) [hereinafter cited as F. MARKS] (exploring the
arguments for drafting lawyers to serve the poor).
133. See supra note 80. It sometimes is argued that the equalization of burdens leads to
their removal. But significant elements of the middle class always have been able to avoid
military service, and it was not the threat of the draft that ended the Vietnam War.
134. There may have been some connection between the use of young conscripts in the
Vietnam War and the lowering of the voting age to 18, but the latter certainly did not give
draftees autonomous control over their lives. Rather, short-term conscription ensures that
those who serve lack expertise, thus confirming their subordination to career officers. Fi-
nally, the use of a draft would be likely to aggravate intergenerational conflict, which al-
ready seems on the rise, as suggested by the repeated refusal of voters (who no longer have
school-age children) in several Michigan towns to approve tax increases in order to preserve
the public school system. Consider also the anger of the Grey Panthers at the suggestion
that the elderly be used to dispose of radioactive waste. See supra note 39.
135. See P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 60; Abel, supra note 1, at 208 n.137; Barratt-
Brown, Aiternative Structuresfor Mining Industry, 30 WORKERS' CONTROL BULL. 8-9 (Dec.
1975). See generally W. CARSON, THE OTHER PRICE OF BRITAIN'S OIL (1982); S. MALLET,
BUREAUCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES (1972); Carson, supra note 17;
Steams, Pitfalls in the Struggle for Humanized Labor Conditions (1981) (unpublished man-
uscript). The treatment of public employee unions - the Professional Air Traffic Control-
lers Organization, for example - confirms this. The total lack of autonomy of employees in
the military (where unions are forbidden) is even stronger evidence.
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and state capitalist regimes amply demonstrates that, though they may
be more solicitous of workers (at least at first), they generally adhere to
principles of "scientific management" and seek to maximize produc-
tion, often at the expense of worker safety.'36
C. Decentralized Socialism and Risk Allocation
1. Case Studies - Autonomous control over and equal exposure
to the risks arising in production can be achieved only under a decen-
tralized socialism in which workers own and control the means of pro-
duction.'37 If no existing society fully realizes this ideal, many
productive arrangements have made significant progress toward it. 138
These include such diverse phenomena as: utopian societies and inten-
tional communities,' 3 9 Israeli kibbutzim; 40 producer cooperatives
136. Steams, supra note 135, at 7; see also McCormack, Lead Poisoning in Yugoslavia
called "Worst", Evening Outlook (Santa Monica, Cal.), Feb. 17, 1982, at A-4.
137. After completing this article, I discovered the following quotation by a prominent
activist for health and safety at work:
Industrial democracy in the United States may well result more as an outgrowth of the
demand for improved health and safety than as an outgrowth of generalized job dissat-
isfaction related to the meaningless nature of work.
Ashford, The Role of Occupational Health and Safety in Industrial Relations: Where We Are
and Where We're Going, 15 INST. LAB. REL. REP. 24, 28 (Spring 1978).
There is evidence that the growth of worker participation in Sweden in the last two
decades was significantly motivated by worker discontent with the hazards and stress of the
workplace. Albrecht, Preconditionsfor Increased Workers' Influence: Factors in the Swedish
Case, 8 Soc. WORK & OCCUPATIONS 252, 264 (1981).
138. It has been estimated that there are 3,000 worker-owned industries in the United
States. See INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, EMPLOYEE
OWNERSHIP (1978). See also Caroy & Levin, Workers Triumph." The Meriden Experiment,
WORKING PAPERS NEW Soc'Y (Winter 1976); Gunn, The Fruits of Rath, WORKING PAPERS
NEW SOC'Y (Mar./Apr. 1981); Gunn, Toward Workers' Control, WORKING PAPERS NEW
Soc'Y (May/June 1980); Herman, Workers, Watches and Self-Management, WORKING PA-
PERS NEW Soc'Y (Winter 1974); Alternative Institutions, 9 J. APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCI. 218
(May/June 1973) (special issue); Rothschild-Whitt, Private Ownership and Workers' Control
in Holland, WORKING PAPERS NEW SOC'Y (Mar./Apr. 1981); Woodworth, Workers as
Bosses, II SOC. POL'Y 40 (Jan./Feb. 1981); Zwerdling, Employee Ownership: How Well is it
Working?, WORKING PAPERS NEW Soc'Y (MAY/JUNE 1979). For overviews of worker
ownership in the United States see generally M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, ECONOMIC DE-
MOCRACY (1980); D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130; WORK & POWER: THE LIBERATION OF
WORK AND THE CONTROL OF POLITICAL POWER (T. Bums, L. Karlsson & V. Rus eds.
1979); WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE (F. Lindenfeld & J. Rothschild-
Whitt eds. 1982); Garson, The Politics of Workers' Control A Review Essay, in WORKERS'
CONTROL 469 (G. Hunnius, G. Garson & J. Case eds. 1973).
139. See, e.g., B. BERGER, THE SURVIVAL OF A COUNTERCULTURE (1981); F. MANUEL &
F. MANUEL, UTOPIAN THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN WORLD (1979). Well-known American
examples of self-supporting intentional communities include Oneida, see M. CARDEN,
ONEIDA (1969), the Hutteritcs, see J. HOSTETLER, HUTrERITE SOCIETY (1974), and the
Bruderhof, see B. ZABLOCKI, THE JOYFUL COMMUNITY (1971). These communities vary in
the degree to which they equalize risk among their members.
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within the capitalist economies of the United States, England, and
Spain; and self-managed socialism in Yogoslavia and briefly in other
socialist regimes, such as Poland and Chile. 4 ' This section will present
brief synopses of two such arrangements; the next will discuss selected
aspects of worker control in greater detail. I must stress at the outset,
however, that control and allocation of risk are never more than
subordinate issues. 142 Some of these enterprises are creatures of neces-
sity; all, rightly, are concerned with more fundamental features of
worker ownership and control; and many are preoccupied by the strug-
gle for survival in what is generally a hostile environment. Indeed, the
major studies of worker control ignore the issue of risk or barely men-
tion it.14
3
(a) Pacific Northwest Plywood Cooperatives - Sixty years ago
workers in a plywood factory in the Pacific Northwest, confronted with
the threat of plant closure, bought the enterprise.144 Others followed
their example (in a few instances creating the firm from scratch), and
now there are sixteen such producer cooperatives in the Pacific North-
west. Each member owns one share in the enterprise, which entitles
him to an equal portion of the profits and an equal vote for the board
of directors and in those major management decisions made directly by
the workers (e.g., capital expenditures exceeding a certain amount).
Workers, as owners, have absolute job security as long as the plant is
open, although some voluntarily take leaves when demand falls and
profits decline because they can make more money as employees else-
where; however, they have a right to return whenever they wish. The
profits distributed generally have been substantially higher than the
140. F. ZWEIG, THE ISRAELI WORKER (1959); Fine, Worker Particiation in Israel, in
WORKERS' CONTROL 226 (G. Hunnius, G. Garson & J. Case eds. 1973).
141. For a comparison of worker control in Chile, Peru, and Mexico, see Marquez, Poli-
tics, Bureaucracy, and Industrial Democracy. A Comparative Framework/or the Analysis of
Worker Control in Latin America, 8 Soc. WORK & OCCUPATIONS 165 (1981).
142. See Deutsch, Work Environment Reform and Industrial Democracy, 8 Soc. WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 180, 189 (1981).
143. See supra notes 136-40; see also C. BELLAS, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE
WORKER-OWNED FIRM: A STUDY OF TWENTY-ONE PLYWOOD COMPANIES IN THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST (1972); K. BERMAN, WORKER-OWNED PLYWOOD COMPANIES: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1967); P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 131; P. BLUMBERG, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY:
THE SOCIOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION (1968); H. BRAVERMAN, supra note 102; J. VANEK, THE
LABOR-MANAGED ECONOMY (1977); J. VANEK, THE PARTICIPATORY ECONOMY (1971); J.
VANEK, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LABOR-MANAGED MARKET ECONOMIES (1970); WORK-
ERS' CONTROL (G. Hunnius, G. Garson & J. Case eds. 1973).
144. The sources for this overview of the Pacific Northwest plywood industry are K.
BERMAN, supra note 143; C. BELLAS, supra note 143; P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 131; D.
ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 95-104.
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wages paid unionized workers in comparable capitalist enterprises be-
cause productivity has been higher and costs lower; for example, there
has been less waste and fewer management salaries to pay. Participa-
tion in governance is high, a good deal higher than in most political
democracies, not only because decisions have a more immediate impact
on the workers but also because membership is small enough (less than
400) that each worker can feel that his voice counts. There is a good
deal of job rotation: when a job falls vacant any member can bid for it;
the job will be awarded on the basis of seniority, but the person who
obtains it then loses all seniority and must begin accumulating it again.
Certain distinctive characteristics of plywood production contrib-
uted to the success and longevity of these enterprises. First, although
financing usually is a problem for cooperatives, this industry is rela-
tively labor-intensive, so that workers did not need to raise a great deal
of capital in advance. Second, because plywood manufacture demands
only a narrow range of skills that are relatively easy to acquire, job
rotation is possible.
Nevertheless, even these cooperatives have encountered obstacles
that have caused them to deviate from the principles of worker control
over, and equal distribution of, risk. As capital costs have risen with
technological change, fewer cooperatives have been founded - none
has been launched within the last twenty-five years. The growth in the
value of the enterprise has increased the price of its shares so that few
can afford to buy into a cooperative when a share becomes available;
thus, the number of members has declined, their places taken by non-
owner employees. The same phenomenon has made the plywood
plants an attractive investment for capitalist enterprises, which have of-
fered so much for the shares that several cooperatives have voted to sell
out. Although job rotation is technologically feasible, not all jobs are
rotated: women are restricted to office work, and some of the least
pleasant tasks are assigned to employees who are not members. The
wages of the latter generally are lower than the profits earned by mem-
bers, and this disparity creates tensions. Management, like dirty work,
also is not performed by the members but rather is entrusted to supervi-
sory employees. This generates additional contradictions: managers
who give orders to their employers and disagreements between man-
agement and ownership with respect to such questions as the distribu-
tion or reinvestment of profits. Nevertheless, these producer
cooperatives demonstrate the possibility of achieving a much higher
degree of control over, and a far more equal distribution of, risk even
within a capitalist economy.
(b) Sunset Scavenger Company - In 1920, ninety-two Italian-
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Americans incorporated the Sunset Scavenger Co. as a cooperative to
collect garbage from residences in San Francisco. 4 5 By 1975 Sunset
had expanded into a conglomerate, Envirocal, Inc., which ranked fifth
among refuse collection companies in the United States in terms of
sales ($25 million), had $6.5 million in assets, and managed 23 indus-
trial/commercial and 175 residential accounts. 46  Although the
number of partners had grown to 320 by 1966, the membership still was
ethnically homogeneous and closely bound by family ties.' 47 After
1968 the number of partners began to decline as the company deliber-
ately bought back the shares of everyone who quit or retired; at the
same time, additional paid helpers were hired, producing a workforce
of more than 600 in 1976, more than half of whom were employees.148
All members receive the same wages, together with an equal share of
profits at the end of the year, and enjoy security of employment. 49
Helpers, by contrast, are paid less and can be fired at will. All workers
do basically the same tasks, although there is some minimal differentia-
tion within the teams of three or four who man each truck. The head
of the team, for instance, also is responsible for collecting bills from
customers. 5 ° Workers control the pace of their work (often pushing
themselves in order to finish early), choose when to take breaks, and
establish their own work rules.'' The routes for which the teams are
responsible are equalized each year.' 52 Although the work is hard and
dirty it has several advantages: it is out-of-doors and varied; a crew
gets to know its neighborhood intimately and feels part of it; and work-
ers often can increase their incomes by scavenging. 15  Managers are
elected from among the workers; although management increasingly
demands specialized skills, every manager has worked the trucks. In
145. The source for all the information about the Sunset Scavenger Company is S.
PERRY, supra note 132.
146. Id. at 161.
147. Id. at 118. Homogeneity may be essential to the success of such an enterprise, at
least at the beginning. Common residence and membership in the Dutch Reformed Church
clearly were strong forces for cohesiveness in the Breman group of enterprises in northwest-
ern Holland, which now involves 600 workers. See Rothschild-Whitt, There's More than
One Way to Run a Democratic Enterprise- Self-Management from the Netherlands, 8 Soc.
WORK & OCCUPATIONS 201, 204 (1981).
148. S. PERRY, supra note 32, at 13, 149, 162.
149. Most of the profits are reinvested. In recent years there has been some graduation in
pay. Id. at 32, 48, 119.
150. Teams recently have been relieved of responsibility for collecting bills. At the same
time, there has been some differentiation of the work of non-partner helpers in order to
justify their lower pay. Id. at 33, 175.
151. Id. at 60, 84, 89.
152. Id. at 152.
153. Id. at 115-17.
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1976 there were only 11 managers for a workforce in excess of 600. 154
They receive the same pay as other workers, have little authority over
the day-to-day work, and enjoy few other perquisites.'55
Garbage collection is one of the most dangerous jobs in the United
States today: on-the-job injuries occur nine times more frequently than
the national average, and no other job category has a higher rate.' 56
Each worker carries a barrel weighing 60-150 pounds and lifts many
tons a day.' 57 Back strain thus is the single greatest source of disabil-
ity. 158 But workers also are routinely cut, scratched, and bruised by
dangerous objects left in the trash, because protective clothing is cum-
bersome and uncomfortable. 59 And they are in constant danger from
traffic.' 60 Sunset was not immune from these problems. In order to
reduce its workers' compensation insurance rates, it took several reme-
dial measures: fining and suspending injured workers and granting no
sick leave.' 6 ' But the cooperative nature of the enterprise also encour-
ages safety; workers are highly motivated to avoid injuries, for fellow-
workers must take over one's responsibilities, and productivity affects
everyone's profits. 62 Therefore, it is noteworthy that the workers' com-
pensation rate at Sunset presently is forty percent lower than the indus-
try average. 163 Workers also show concern for each other after an
injury has occurred."6 Some may be assigned trucks with shorter
routes; others may be given one of the limited number of jobs in the
office and yard that make fewer physical demands.' 65 Here, again,
worker ownership appears to be associated with greater control over,
and equalization of, risk.
Both the statement of the principles that should govern risk alloca-
tion and the brief sketches of two functioning systems that approximate
those ideals have suggested the general contours of a socialist approach
154. Id. at 162, 166. This ratio of one manager/inspector for every 60 workers should be
compared with the overall American ratio of 1:10 and the Japanese ratio of 1:200. See
Thurow, Death by a Thousand Cuts, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 3, 4 (Dec. 17, 1981).
155. S. PERRY, supra note 132, at 137-39. There now is some pay differential. Id. at 48.
156. Id. at 8-9, 216-17.
157. Id. at 54.
158. Id. at 99. Half of all injuries are sprains and strains.
159. Id. at 66-68.
160. Id. at 104.
161. Id. at 45-46. Penalties since have been abolished, but sick leave still is not granted.
162. Id. at 96, 199.
163. Id. at 9.
164. Id. at 99-100.
165. Id. at 167, 170-71. Kibbutzim also reserve lighter jobs for older workers. See
Melman. Industrial Effiency under Managerial vs. Cuoperative Decision-Making." A Compar-
ative Study of Manufacturing Enterprises in Israel, 2 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 9, 27 (Spr.
1970).
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to the problem of risk in production. The remainder of this section will
draw upon a wide range of examples to elaborate the conditions for,
consequences of, and problems associated with pursuing autonomous
control over, and equalization of, risk. These three categories are
merely heuristic; conditions not only are instrumental prerequisites but
also may be ultimate goals, and consequences may be preconditions for
other results.
2. Conditions - (a) Autonomous work groups - The day-to-
day operations of the enterprise are performed by small groups of
workers (usually less than a dozen) who have considerable autonomy
in determining their conditions of work. The ratio of managers to
workers is much lower than it is in the capitalist firm. 66 This structure
is found in extremely diverse settings: Chinese factories; 1 67 certain coal
mines in both the United States 168 and England; 169 a dog food plant in
Topeka, Kansas; 70 a multipurpose crisis counselling center;'' and the
Sunset Scavenger Co. 172 Work groups typically exercise control not
only over production but also over maintenance, and sometimes over
discipline, hiring, and firing.
17 3
(b) Democratic participation in the control of the enterprise
This may be the single most fundamental condition, for everything else
flows from it."14 Indeed, some alternative organizations view it as so
important that, when participation in governance declines, they prefer
to dissolve rather than lapse into a more traditional hierarchic mode of
166. See supra note 154 and accompanying text; see also WORK IN AMERICA, supra note
47, at 96-97; Melman, supra note 165.
167. See C. BETTELHEIM, supra note 74, at 87; Lockett, Bridging the Division of Labour?
The Case of China, I EcON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 447, 472-74 (1980).
168. See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 31-40; Trist, Susman & Brown, An Experi-
ment in Autonomous Working in an American Underground Coal Mine, 30 HuM. REL. 201
(1977).
169. E. TRIST, G. HIGGIN, H. MURRAY & A. POLLOCK, ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICE: CA-
PABILITIES OF GROUPS AT THE COAL FACE UNDER CHANGING TECHNOLOGIES: THE LOSS,
RE-DISCOVERY AND TRANSFORMATION OF A WORK TRADITION (1963) [hereinafter cited as
E. TRIST].
170. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 23.
17 1. See Mansbridge,Acceptable Inequalities, 7 BRIT. J. POL. ScI. 321 (1977). For a fuller
exposition of the political philosophy of this author see also J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND AD-
VERSARY DEMOCRACY (1981).
172. S. PERRY, supra note 132, at 55.
173. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 23.
174. The collectivity as a whole is the only source of legitimate authority. See Roths-




decisionmaking.'I" At a minimum, every worker should have an equal
vote in the selection of management. 76 But most enterprises go be-
yond this. Some may involve a limited number of workers directly in
management: twenty percent of the workers in the General Knitwear
Factory in Peking performed managerial tasks, in accord with Mao's
two participations.' 77 Finally, a few strive for a direct democracy in
which the more important decisions, at least, are made by the workers
as a whole. Such a structure must overcome apathy 178 and seek to
counteract the influence of pre-existing status and personality differ-
ences on levels of participation. 179 It may do so by requiring every
worker to voice an opinion8 ° and may enhance sensitivity to process
through mutual and self-criticism.' 8 ' Even then some areas of deci-
sionmaking may be excluded - financial planning, for instance."8 2
And the process inevitably will be very time-consuming: ' 3 the multi-
purpose crisis counselling center found that its members spent seven
hours a week in meetings.I 4 Yet the time demanded by meetings must
be viewed against the background of the capitalist firm. If production
workers presently spend virtually no time on governance, managers
devote half their time to talking to each other. Worker control thus
may not increase the time spent in decisionmaking but simply redistrib-
ute it.
Participatory democracy is not easy to achieve. ' 8 5 Success appears
to vary inversely with size; because the upper limit is about 300, larger
plants must be broken down into relatively autonomous subunits. 86
But the smaller the enterprise the weaker it will be when interacting
175. Rothschild-Whitt, Conditions for Democracy.- Making Paricipatory Organizations
Work, in Co-ops, COMMUNES & COLLECTIVES: EXPERIMENTS IN SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE
1960s AND 1970s, at 219-21 (J. Case & R. Taylor eds. 1979).
176. This is true in all the Pacific Northwest Plywood cooperatives. See supra note 144.
177. C. BETTELHEIM, supra note 74, at 77; Lockett, supra note 167, at 471.
178. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 12, 79. At the Breman group of enterprises in the
Netherlands, about 80% of the members participated in elections for the workers' councils.
See Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 175, at 215.
179. Mansbridge, supra note 171, at 323. Employee associations also may seek to educate
their members in their new rights and responsibilities. See Rothschild-Whitt, supra note
175, at 216-17.
180. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 87.
181. Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 175, at 221.
182. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 125.
183. Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 99, at 519-20.
184. Mansbridge, supra note 175, at 323.
185. For a skeptical view by a socialist writer, see Walzer, A Day in the Life ofa Socialist
Citizen, in RADICAL PRINCIPLES: REFLECTIONS OF AN UNRECONSTRUCTED DEMOCRAT 128
(1980).
186. P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 25-26; D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 101, 160-
61; Johnson & White, supra note 97.
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with other larger firms (although cooperation among worker-controlled
enterprises may compensate for this).187 Worker homogeneity, whether
derived from common ethnic origins or a shared ideological commit-
ment, also facilitates self-governance.1
8 8
(c) Job rotation -
In communist society, however, where nobody has an exclusive
area of activity and each can train himself in any branch he
wishes, society regulates the general production, making it possible
for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the
morning, fish in the afternoon, breed cattle in the evening, criticize
after dinner, just as I like, without ever becoming a hunter, fisher-
man, herdsman, or a critic.18 9
Job rotation is mandated by the second principle of risk alloca-
tion - equality. But it is considerably more controversial and prob-
lematic than autonomy, both as an ideal and in practice. Indeed, some
worker-controlled enterprises do not rotate jobs at all. 190 Many do,
however, and they represent a broad range of enterprises: mining;' 9'
motorcycle production; 92 food cooperatives; 193 dog food processing; 94
and the plywood manufacturing and garbage collection examples dis-
cussed earlier.'95 Not all jobs may be rotated: the plywood coopera-
tives limit women to office work. '96 Salient physiological differences of
strength or dexterity may place restrictions on job rotation. 9' So may
differences of skill and knowledge - rotation can be implemented
most fully where the various skills are related and easily acquired.
Some of the most highly skilled jobs may have to be excluded; but
187. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 15; Melman, supra note 165.
188. S. Perry, supra note 132, at 118; D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 133-34; Melman,
supra note 165; Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 99, at 513-18.
189. K. MARX & F. ENGELS, The German Ideology, in WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX
ON PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 403, 424-25 (L. Easton & K. Guddat trans. & eds. 1967); see
also Gorz, Workers' Control is More Than Just That, in WORKERS' CONTROL 325, 338 (G.
Hunnius, G. Garson & J. Case eds. 1973).
190. See Johnson & Whyte, supra note 97.
191. See supra notes 168-69.
192. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 147-48.
193. Id. at 81-94.
194. Id. at 20.
195. See supra notes 144-64; see also WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 47, at 101-03. Kib-
butzim also rotate jobs, see Melman, supra note 165, at 26, as do some intentional communi-
ties, e.g., B. ZABLOCKI, supra note 139, at 133.
196. K. BERMAN, supra note 143, at 148. This kind of sex-discrimination, of course, no
longer is legal.
197. But these should not be exaggerated. See 5 FEMINIST STUDIES 233-329 (1979)
(seven essays on women's health and safety in the workplace).
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these usually carry lower risks; and their privileged occupants still may
be required to perform other, more dangerous, tasks. Some enterprises
rotate only the most unpleasant or most routine jobs;198 by analogy,
workers might decide to rotate only those entailing unusually high
risks. Job rotation is more attractive when each task is intrinsically
interesting, usually because it allows the worker to exercise skill -
where the work is artisanal or at least a continuous process rather than
assembling component parts or working on an assembly line.' 99 Alter-
nating between several dull jobs does not greatly reduce the boredom
of each, although changing tasks every few hours may afford some
relief.2"
Studies have shown that workers prefer job rotation,20 1 although it
is important to note the cost to those who are prevented from exercising
some particular talent to the fullest. Even enterprises that are not
worker-owned may offer employees incentives to participate in job ro-
tation - for instance, by increasing the rate of pay for each additional
task mastered.20 2 Quite apart from its intrinsic value to the worker, job
rotation increases the flexibility of the work force in responding to la-
bor demands within the enterprise and thereby alleviates problems
caused by labor shortage and absenteeism. 203 The principles of auton-
omy and equality even may be taken a step further: producers may
share their skills not only with each other2° but also with consumers
(especially consumers of services), thereby liberating consumers from
dependence on specialist producers. 20 5 Finally, job rotation not only
may equalize risk but actually may reduce it. Many dangers increase
as the individual is continuously exposed to them, for reasons that may
be either psychological (stress, boredom, fatalism)2" or physiological
198. See, e.g., M. SPIRO, KIBBUTZ, VENTURE IN UTOPIA 77 (1963); Mansbridge, supra
note 171, at 323 (crisis center).
199. See P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 107; R. BLAUNER, supra note 107; J. ESPINOSA
& A. ZIMBALIST, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY: WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN CHILEAN INDUS-
TRY 1970-1973, at 167 (1978).
200. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 86.
201. See, e.g., P. BLUMBERG, supra note 143, at 66-69 (here referred to as job
enlargement).
202. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 20; cf. Trist, Susman & Brown, supra note 168, at
206 (miners in experimental work group encouraged to learn as many jobs as possible).
203. Lockett, supra note 167, at 473; see also Trist, Susman & Brown, supra note 168, at
211 (diversification of job skills minimizes delay because workers closest to a problem can
take corrective action rather than waiting for specialists).
204. Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 99, at 517-18; Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 175, at
230-32.
205. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 85, 89.
206. See E. TRIST, supra note 169, at 123, 175; Fitzpatrick, supra note 15, at 132; Hale &
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(accumulations of toxic chemicals, exposure to radiation).20 7 On the
other hand, some risks will increase because of inexperience (although
the reduction in turnover and absenteeism, discussed below, will ex-
pose fewer novices to danger). But if risk rises, for the privileged few
whose jobs or managerial status previously protected them, it drops for
the vast majority.
(d) Equal income - This appears to be logically entailed by each
of the previous conditions: if all workers simultaneously are owners
and managers, if they own the enterprise, and if skills are widely dis-
seminated so that jobs and risks can be shared, what justification re-
mains for wage or profit differentials?20 8 Indeed, all of these enterprises
have taken enormous steps toward income equalization. It is not un-
common for wages within the capitalist enterprise to vary by as much
as 100:1 (and of course profit, income, and wealth differentials within
capitalist society are even greater). In China, Cuba, Poland, Yugosla-
via, and Chile under Allende a broad spectrum of socialist enterprises
reduced wage differentials to two or three to one. 2 9 A few producer
cooperatives have sought complete equality: a coal mine,210 a motorcy-
cle manufacturer, 21 the plywood factories, 21 2 Sunset Scavenger Co.,
213
and the multipurpose crisis center.214 Such an income distribution ob-
viously is attractive to the majority whose wages rise as a result, but it
does require sacrifices by the few whose salaries decline.21 In order to
achieve equality, firms have eliminated piecework rates and production
Perusse, Altitudes to Safety: Facts and Assumptions, in SAFETY AT WORK 73 (J. Phillips ed.
1977).
207. P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 96; S. EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at ch. 5.
208. Most intentional communities also share income equally and generally make
purchases collectively rather than distribute profits to members. See M. CARDEN, ONEIDA
(1969); R. HINE, CALIFORNIA'S UTOPIAN COLONIES (1973); F. MANUEL & F. MANUEL,
supra note 139; M. SPIRO, supra note 198; B. ZABLOCKI, supra note 195; Melman, supra note
165, at 25.
209. C. BETrELHEIM, supra note 74, at 15-16; J. ESPINOSA & A. ZIMBALIST, supra note
199, at 138-41; Lockett, supra note 167; MacEwan, supra note 100, at 95; see also Johnson &
Whyte, supra note 97 (not a socialist society).
A worker-controlled enterprise inspired by Christian rather than socialist principles
reduced the overall income differential (combining wages and profits) to about 3:1. See
Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 147, at 203, 213.
210. Cf. Trist, Susman & Brown, supra note 168, at 205 (experimental autonomous work
groups in American coal mine).
211. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 147.
212. K. BERMAN, supra note 143, at 151.
213. S. PERRY, supra note 132, at 32. But inequalities now are emerging. Id. at 48.
214. Mansbridge, supra note 171, at 323.
215. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 28.
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quotas.2" 6 This has the important side effect of decreasing accidents. 217
It also increases reliance on collective rather than individual incentives
to motivate workers.218 The elimination of wage differentials almost
always is accompanied by the erosion of other status distinctions, such
as the symbols of dress and address.219
3. Consequences - (a) Attitude - Alienation in work is the
hallmark of capitalism. This is not just an axiom of marxist theory220
but also has been confirmed repeatedly by numerous empirical studies
conducted by both marxist and non-marxist social scientists. 22' Indeed,
capitalists, workers, and even labor unions long accepted such aliena-
tion as inevitable and focused their energies on consumption as the re-
ward for performing work that was viewed as inescapably
dehumanizing. Worker control thus revolutionizes culture as well as
productive relations by refusing to accept alienation, insisting on mak-
ing work intrinsically valuable.222 Virtually every experiment has in-
creased worker involvement in, and enthusiasm for, work,223 although
the short-term effects of innovation quickly wear off if workers are not
truly empowered to control their environment and to benefit from the
decisions they make.224 Workers relish the sense of autonomy, the feel-
ing that they are their own bosses. 225 The solidarity naturally created
by shared experience and collective work toward a common goal226 is
strengthened by participation in decisionmaking, both in daily events
216. Id. at 13-14; J. ESPINOSA & A. ZIMBALIST, supra note 199, at 169.
217. Stearns, supra note 18, at 22.
218. MacEwan, supra note 100, at 91.
219. Id. at 102; see also WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 47, at 98; D. ZWERDLING, supra
note 130, at 22; Lockett, supra note 167, at 474.
220. H. BRAVERMAN, supra note 102; B. OLLMAN, supra note 71, at 131-233; Gorz, supra
note 189.
221. WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 47, at 11-23; R. BLAUNER, supra note 107; E. CHI-
NOY, supra note 47; D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 103.
222. There is a merging of work and non-work, which capitalism strictly segregates. See
D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 49-50; Melman, supra note 165, at 29.
223. See Carnoy & Shearer, supra note 138, at 177; Harrison, The Owenite Socialist Move-
ment in Britain and the United States, in I MANY PASTS (H. Guttman & G. Kealey eds.
1973); Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 147, at 210-11, 215-16. But see D. ZWERDLING, supra
note 130, at 133-34 (International Group Plans, a top-down innovation by the own-
er/director, produced widespread disaffection and high absenteeism and turnover).
224. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 143, at ch. 3; D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 28, 162.
225. S. PERRY, supra note 132, at 84. See generally D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130.
226. The combination of goal-directed activity and risk appears to generate a high degree
of integration, expressed in the form of mechanical rather than organic solidarity. See Haas,
supra note 147; V aught & Smith, Incorporation and Mechanical Solidarity in an Underground
Coal Mine, 7 Soc. WORK & OCCUPATIONS 159 (1980). If so, it fosters precisely the social
structural characteristics described above: autonomous work groups, job-sharing, and equal
income.
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on the shop floor and in periodic meetings called to resolve larger is-
sues. The intensity of emotional interaction increases; workers' con-
cern for each other is visible in their cooperation and comraderie, their
efforts to teach each other, and their concern for those who are hurt.22 7
The experience of being an embattled vanguard in a hostile environ-
ment further accentuates commitment to the idea of worker control. 228
(b) Labor turnover and absenteeism - The flight from work is
perhaps the clearest expression of the depth of alienation under capital-
ism: studies suggest that present rates of turnover and absenteeism
have not declined appreciably from those at the beginning of the cen-
tury.229 But both drop dramatically under workers' control. 230 First,
worker ownership affords true security of employment: no one can lay
off owners; if demand falls, workers reduce the hours or production of
each and share whatever work remains.23 Voluntary turnover is ex-
traordinarily low: three percent a year at one factory, much of it con-
sisting of women taking temporary maternity leaves.232 In many cases
participation in ownership becomes tantamount to lifetime employ-
ment. Transitory turnover, i.e., absenteeism, also declines. In one firm,
sick leave dropped fifty percent and unexcused absences ninety per-
cent;233 in another, the absentee rate was only 1.5% of the workforce.23 4
Low turnover and absenteeism also should contribute to greater pro-
ductivity and enhanced safety, because workers do not have to assume
as many additional, often unfamiliar, tasks or cooperate with new part-
ners, and fewer of them are inexperienced.235
227. S. PERRY, supra note 132, at 96, 99-100; D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 27;
Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 99, at 513-18.
228. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 131, at 133-34; Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 175, at 233.
229. See WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 47, at 100-01; P. BLUMBERG, supra note 143, at
63 (study showed annual turnover of 55-75% in one office); J. ESPINOSA & A. ZIMBALIST,
supra note 199, at 20; cf. Ferrari, Absenteeism and Legal Reform, 1978 EUROPEAN YEAR-
BOOK L. & Soc. 97 (1979) (Italy).
230. M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, supra note 138, at 180; Rothschild-Whitt, supra note
147, at 215.
231. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 48.
232. Johnson & Whyte, supra note 97, at 24; cf. S. PERRY, supra note 132, at 119 (low
turnover); P. BLUMBERG, supra note 143, at 111-12 & passim (low turnover).
233. See E. TRIST, supra note 169, at 123; see also M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, supra note
138, at 180; J. ESPINOSA & A. ZIMBALIST, supra note 199, at 144; Trist, Susman & Brown,
supra note 168, at 218.
234. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 24.
235. C. GERSUNY, supra note 5, at 64. Involuntary turnover also is extremely traumatic;
layoffs and unemployment cause hypertension, coronary illness, ulcers, diabetes, and sui-




(c) Productivity - Virtually every study has shown that worker
control increases productivity, no matter how the larger economy is
structured, how production is organized, or what is produced: whether
in kibbutz factories,236 Pacific Northwest plywood companies, 237 a
plant that assembles rear-view automobile mirrors,238 a truck farm in
23924California, I a motorcycle assembly plant in England,24° coal mines in
both the United States and the United Kingdom, 24' Polish factories
during the brief period when they were governed by workers' coun-
cils, 242 and in the "social area" of production in Chile under Al-
lende. 24 3  In a dog-food plant, seventy workers operating in
autonomous teams achieved a production goal that management had
estimated would require 110 workers organized in a traditional hierar-
chy, and they lowered materials costs five percent as well.244 The im-
provement in worker attitude and the decline in turnover and
absenteeism are part of the explanation for higher productivity, but an-
other factor may be even more important. One of the principal contra-
dictions of capitalism is that it requires worker creativity in order to
achieve high levels of production, while hierarchic structures of control
simultaneously deny the worker the requisite autonomy. 245 Autono-
mous control releases the creativity inherent in workers, allowing them
to resolve routine hitches in production - fixing a broken machine
rather than standing idle waiting for the repairman to appear 246 - and
to restructure that process in more fundamental ways.24 7  It also
236. Fine, supra note 140, at 253; Melman, supra note 165, at 17.
237. C. BELLAS, supra note 143, at 29; K. BERMAN, supra note 143, at 188-89.
238. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 46.
239. Id. at 109-10.
240. Id. at 147-48.
241. E. TRIST, supra note 169, at 124-25; Trist, Susman & Brown, supra note 168, at 211,
219-20.
242. For a general discussion of increased productivity under worker control, see J. Espi-
NOSA & A. ZIMBALIST, supra note 199, at 128.
243. See id. at 159-62; see also WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 47, at 27 (worker control
resulted in productivity increases of 5-40%); P. BLUMBERG, supra note 143, at 97-98 (worker
control of some aspects of production in toy assembly plant resulted in productivity increase
of 30-50%); M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, supra note 138, at 179; Johnson & Whyte, supra
note 97, at 27.
244. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 24.
245. See generaly H. BRAVERMAN, supra note 102; M. BuRAwoy, MANUFACTURING
CONSENT: CHANGES IN THE LABOR PROCESS UNDER MONOPOLY CAPITALISM (1979); R.
EDWARDS, supra note 122; D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 103. For support from a non-
Marxist point of view, see J. O'TOOLE, MAKING AMERICA WORK: PRODUCTIVITY AND RE-
SPONSIBILITY (1981). But perhaps the best evidence of the need for worker autonomy is
provided when employees work to rule. See, e.g., R. EDWARDS, supra note 122, at 154-55.
246. D. ZWERDLING, supr_-z note 130, at 45-46; Trist, Susman & Brown, supra note 168, at
211.
247. J. ESPINOSA & A. ZIMBALIST, supra note 199, at 150.
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reduces the guerilla forays of capitalist class warfare - the attacks on
productivity in the form of defective products, theft, and industrial
sabotage.248
(d) Safety - I have left this issue for last, even though it is the
subject of the present article, because it is not the principal inspiration
for worker control. Workers are motivated by other intrinsic goals (au-
tonomy, participation, equality, enhancing the value of work), by other
consequences (security of employment, increased productivity and its
material rewards), or by necessity (plant closures). Nevertheless there
is some evidence that workers, granted responsibility for controlling
their own risks, are strongly committed to improving and equalizing
safety.249 Safety is one of the first issues that engages workers when
they begin to exercise their new autonomy,250 whether in the "social
area" of Allende's Chile25' or elected workers' councils in Yugosla-
via.252 Workers at Harmon Industries attacked the problems of exces-
sive heat, cold, and air pollution.253 Mexican-American farmers at the
Cooperativa Central voted to limit the use of pesticides. 254 Reporters
and editors at the Minneapolis Star Tribune investigated the dangers of
visual display units.255 And the Sunset Scavenger Co. discouraged em-
ployees from taking unnecessary risks by means of fines, suspensions,
and the denial of sick pay.256 Safety precautions adopted by workers
themselves are implemented more thoroughly than those imposed by
management.257 Workers who depend on each other to maintain pro-
duction (and thus profits), and who are united by strong bonds of soli-
darity, also are more concerned for the safety of others.258 At the same
time, there is a real danger that workers may sacrifice safety for short-
248. Id. at 147.
249. Both Norway, and to a lesser extent Sweden, consciously sought to involve workers
in controlling their own environments in order to improve their health and safety; the avail-
able empirical data confirm the success of this strategy. See Deutsch, supra note 142, at 184-
88. Workers even can take the initiative without enjoying control. See, e.g., Howard, Health
and Safety: One Man Scoops the Experts, In These Times, Mar. 18-31, 1981 (journeyman
pipefitter at GM body plant conducted epidemiological study of fellow workers, demonstrat-
ing mortality rates significantly higher than national average).
250. P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 52; M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER, supra note 138, at
176; Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 147, at 206-07.
251. J. ESPINOSA & A. ZIMBALIST, supra note 199, at 131.
252. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 143, at 203.
253. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 45.
254. Id. at 108. The manager of the Cooperativa Central insisted that he was going to
defy the farmers and use the pesticides, even though he was their employee!
255. Id. at 177.
256. S. PERRY, supra note 132, at 45-46.
257. See Hale & Perusse, supra note 206; Steams, supra note 18, at 22.
258. S. PERRY, supra note 132, at 199; Fitzpatrick, supra note 15, at 146, 150-51.
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term economic self-interest. They certainly may do so to preserve their
economic livelihoods. For example, when the employees of the Ver-
mont Asbestos Group bought their mine from the conglomerate that
wanted to shut it down, they strenuously resisted the Environmental
Protection Agency's order to improve ventilation, arguing that "their"
asbestos did not cause lung damage or cancer - a position for which
there was absolutely no scientific support.259 More often workers, like
the owners of small businesses, will drive themselves too hard, increas-
ing the pace of work, working longer hours, or ignoring safety rules. 260
Of course, this is partly attributable to capitalist pressures (economic,
political, sociocultural) on the socialist experiment. Yet self-imposed
stress does not appear to increase accidents, at least not as much as
speedups ordered by management.26'
Worker control and job rotation, by definition, serve the two prin-
ciples of risk allocation I have advanced: autonomy and equality.
Therefore whatever level of risk workers may choose is axiomatically
the right level. But one still would like to know whether rates of work
injury and illness decline. The very limited data available suggest they
do.26 2 I noted above that Sunset Scavenger Co. pays a workers' com-
pensation insurance premium forty percent lower than the industry av-
26erage. 63 One reason may be that ownership and control endow
members with a pride that counterbalances their extremely low status
as garbage collectors and thus overcomes the strong tendency of low-
status work to have high rates of illness and injury, apparently because
poor self-esteem translates into disregard for safety.26 4 Several other
case studies show similar results. The General Foods dog food plant in
Topeka, Kansas had no lost-time accidents among its seventy employ-
ees during a four-year period, a total of 280 worker years.265 In the
Rushton Mining Co. in Occola Mills, Pennsylvania, time lost due to
259. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 54-55, 60. The asbestos mine is the only em-
ployer in the area, which explains why these workers "choose" dangerous jobs: "They say
you can die of cancer from asbestos after 30 years . . . but you can starve to death in a
year." Id. at 60.
260. Id. at 12; S. PERRY, supra note 132, at 60, 93.
261. E. TRIST, supra note 169, at 138-40.
262. Traditional firms are likely to understate official accident rates. Firms often try to
keep down lost-time rates (and thus workers' compensation insurance premiums) by using a
"wounded brigade" of employees who clock in for a full day, although they are disabled
from doing any work. See Moberg, The Steelworkers Take on a Tough One, In These
Times, Dec. 16-22, 1981, at 5-6. Unions may even collude in this practice. Steams, supra
note 135, at 14.
263. S. PERRY, supra note 132, at 8-9.
264. Id.
265. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 24.
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injuries in the work group composed of autonomous teams practicing
job sharing stayed constant, while lost time in the traditional work
group more than doubled.266 And in a comparable experiment in a
mine in Durham, England, the accident rate was cut in half.
267
4. Problems - In describing how worker control promotes an
autonomous and equal allocation of risk, I naturally have stressed its
advantages. But I do not wish to minimize the obstacles that confront
any attempt to create socialist relations of production, especially within
an alien and hostile capitalist environment. One is the problem of ex-
pertise. Both capitalism and particular capitalist enterprises systemati-
cally deny production workers knowledge about essential aspects of
running a business: cost accounting, pricing, marketing, financing,
etc.268 Workers may feel they cannot learn these functions, even given
time and training.2 69 A common solution is to hire an outside manager
who does not participate in ownership or decisionmaking but rather
carriers out the policies of the worker-owners. 270 The danger, however,
is that the manager progressively will assume control, especially as the
enterprise expands, either because he or she seeks power or because the
workers relinquish it.27 I After all, we have known for half a century
that ownership of the capitalist enterprise can be divorced from man-
agement;272 it should not be surprising to find that same tendency ac-
centuated in worker-owned enterprises.273 But even if workers do
retain control, tensions persist: managers feel threatened by the ambi-
guity of their roles;274 there often is controversy over long-range plan-
ning because workers seek to maximize immediate gain;2 75 and the
266. Trist, Susman & Brown, supra note 168, at 217.
267. E. TRIST, supra note 169, at 123.
268. Worker ownership does not eliminate, and may indeed aggravate, the problems of
coordination among enterprises. If the worker-owners choose the market to solve cordina-
tion problems, management may regain significant control, J. ESPINSOSA & A. ZIMBALIST,
supra note 199, at 26.
269. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 134, at 15.
270. Id. at 105-17; C. BELLAS, supra note 143, at 53.
271. K. BERMAN, supra note 143, at 162; S. PERRY, supra note 132, at 163-64; see supra
note 46.
272. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
273. P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 39. The enterprises owned by Histadrut, the Israeli
Federation of Labor, illustrate this. Id. at 58; J. TAUB & A. GOLDFARB, WORKERS' PARTICI-
PATION IN MANAGEMENT: EXPECTATIONS AND EXPERIENCE (1970).
274. K. BERMAN, supra note 143, ch. 10.
275. See P. BERNSTEIN, upra note 131, at 18. Compare D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130,
at 61, 99 with K. BERMAN, supra note 143, at 152. See general, M. CARNOY & D. SHEARER,
supra note 138, at 146, 172. It may be possible to reduce this tension if every worker serves
as a manager, however briefly.
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result may be high management turnover.276
Just as there is a danger of re-creating hierarchy at the top, so it
also may be reproduced at the bottom. Producer cooperatives almost
always begin with every worker owning an equal share of the enter-
prise. Yet, for a variety of reasons, many cooperatives soon hire em-
ployees who are not, and cannot become, owners. Worker-owners may
shirk the jobs that are dirtiest, physically most taxing, or least skilled
and therefore most boring; rather than rotate these tasks they hire out-
siders to perform them.277 Employees give the producer cooperative
(like its capitalist counterpart) a flexible labor supply; whereas owners
have a right to work, employees can be hired and fired at will.278 The
very success of the enterprise fosters reliance on hired labor, for as
profits are reinvested, each worker's ownership share grows in value,
making it increasingly difficult for new employees to buy in. As a re-
sult, workers who retire or depart either retain their shares or else they
sell them to the enterprise or to an outside investor.2 79 In each case
owners must be replaced by nonowning employees. Ultimately, this
process will transform the cooperative into a capitalist firm.
The suspicion and hostility that socialist relations of production
elicit in a capitalist environment reinforce the pressures on the produ-
cer cooperative to abandon its principles and drift back toward capital-
ism. First, cooperatives have enormous difficulty securing external
financing, which is, if anything, more essential than it is for the tradi-
tional firm, because the workers themselves can contribute very little
working capital.2 ° When financial institutions make loans, they fre-
quently impose onerous conditions, insisting, for instance, that workers
relinquish control to managers.28 ' Second, cooperatives must compete
with capitalist enterprises, which not only have superior access to
276. C. BELLAS, supra note 143, at 53-54.
277. E.g., M. CARDEN, supra note 208, at 42 (Oneida); D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at
102 (Pacific Northwest plywood cooperatives). But see M. SPIRO, supra note 198, at 15 &
n. 10 (Israeli kibbutz).
278. K. BERMAN, supra note 143, at 147-48; S. PERRY, supra note 132.
279. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 103-04; S. PERRY, supra note 132, at 150. It is
possible to construct a legal form for the enterprise that makes this impossible by giving the
enterprise itself or its members a right of first refusal when membership shares are offered
for sale, or by requiring any purchaser to accept the principle of workers' control. See
Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 147, at 221.
280. Workers at a roller bearing plant in Clark, New Jersey, recently negotiated an agree-
ment to buy the factory from GM, which had planned to close it. But when they sought a
$15 million loan to keep the plant in operation, both the U.S. Department of Commerce and
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development turned them down because the
loans were intended to create new jobs, not preserve existing ones. L.A. Times, Dec. 16,
1981, § IV, at 1.
281. D. ZwERDLING, supra note 130, at 107.
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finance capital but also possess advantages of size. Producer coopera-
tives start small and cannot grow beyond 300-400 workers, although
they can gain some economies of scale by collaborating with other sim-
ilar enterprises.2 82 Individual corporations, conglomerates, and mul-
tinationals can be hundreds, even thousands of times larger and can
use that power to crush a worker-owned competitor.283 Furthermore,
corporations can distribute risk unequally and compel employees to ac-
cept it, thereby externalizing accident costs as an element of the cost of
production and gaining a competitive advantage. But if it is axiomatic
that capital will be antagonistic to worker ownership and control, it
may be surprising that organized labor also is resistant. 28 4 American
unions have harbored many suspicions about such experiments:
worker control may be merely a smokescreen for management-directed
speedups intended to increase production; if workers do not own the
enterprise, management always can withdraw whatever benefits it con-
fers; worker participation dilutes the essentially adversary relationship
between labor and management and can become a covert form of
union-busting.285 Indeed, the cumulative effect of these fears may per-
suade workers voluntarily to terminate experiments in job sharing and
control.286 Yet if such suspicions ever are justified, it is only because
worker control and ownership have been realized imperfectly, not be-
cause they are inherently subversive of the interests of labor.
The final problem may be the most intractable, for it is inherent in
decentralized socialism. Worker ownership and control grants workers
within each enterprise autonomy in managing production risks, and it
equalizes their exposure to those risks. It does not ensure autonomy or
equality for non-workers who may be endangered by the enterprise, a
problem I deal with below. It also fails to equalize exposure among
workers at different enterprises.28 7 In order to achieve such equality it
282. Melman, supra note 165, at 28; Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 147, at 220.
283. Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 175.
284. See Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 147, at 217-18. Cf. Woodworth, supra note 138, at
43-44 (International union decided not to assist local in its effort to purchase plant for work-
ers' benefit, referring to such activity as outside the bounds of organized labor's traditional
role).
285. H. CLEGG, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISATION (1951); D.
ZWERDLING, rupra note 130, at 167-82; H. CLEGG, A NEW APPROACH TO INDUSTRIAL DE-
MOCRACY (1960).
286. Trist, Susman & Brown, supra note 168, at 228.
287. Discussions with colleagues have suggested additional difficulties. First, workers
within an enterprise will have to agree on a level of risk acceptable to all, for otherwise the
autonomy of the dissenting workers will be violated. I believe that such a consensus can be
attained through reasoned discussion when workers confront a common danger and com-
mon incentives. Furthermore, the dissenters should have the option of either starting their
own enterprise or looking for another enterprise in the same area of production where the
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would be necessary to rotate workers not only among jobs within an
enterprise but also among different kinds of enterprises.288 Although I
thought about this possibility, I have concluded that its drawbacks sim-
ply are too great. Whereas job rotation within the enterprise enhances
group solidarity and increases productivity, the transfer of workers
from one enterprise to another would undermine the integration of
each and reduce its efficiency. Movement between industries would
erode a worker's skills rather than expand his repertoire. It is either
inconsistent with worker ownership or would require frequent transfers
of shares, undermining the worker's commitment to any one enterprise.
It would significantly undercut the capacity of workers to participate in
governance. It would disrupt their lives. And it would require an enor-
mous administrative apparatus endowed with awesome coercive pow-
ers.289 Therefore, though I am painfully aware of the enormous
differences in risk between, say, publishing and mining (and in the
other characteristics that make work more or less attractive), I now be-
lieve that the choice of an enterprise must be left to the worker. If
enterprises were vertically integrated (so that mining included sales and
publishing included printing); if jobs were equally shared within the
enterprise; if members of the society really had equal opportunities
before making their choices of where to work; and if the enterprises
themselves competed freely for labor and sales so that enterprise profits
actually reflected the risks borne by workers; then it might be reason-
able to view the composite of risk and income as equal across enter-
prises and to allow idiosyncratic preferences for or aversions to risk to
influence career choice.
IV. RISK IN REPRODUCTION
A. The Problem
The sphere of reproduction - by which I mean primarily the con-
level of risk more closely resembles their own preferences. Second, it has been argued that
worker-controlled enterprises operating within a market economy will engage in a self-de-
structive competition to see which can achieve the highest levels of production at the lowest
direct costs through the sacrifice of safety. I believe there are sound structural reasons why
this parody of capitalism will not occur under decentralized socialism. Whereas the capital-
ist has strong incentives to endanger the worker but few reasons to protect him or her, the
worker must balance higher income against the countervailing attraction of greater safety.
Enterprises will strike that balance differently. But there is no reason why various enter-
prises cannot produce a particular good at the same price even though the enterprises place
varying emphasis on higher profits, shorter hours or greater safety.
288. This happened to some extent during the Chinese Cultural Revolution. See Lockett,
supra note 167, at 470-75.
289. Compulsory military service illustrates many of the problems.
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sumption of goods and services (I deal below with "involuntary con-
sumption," i.e., pollution) - presents problems of risk allocation that
almost are the mirror images of those found in the sphere of produc-
tion. I will have less to say under this heading both because the level of
risk arguably is lower and because the remedies I propose are less radi-
cal - reform rather than abolition of capitalist relations of ex-
change.29° I also think it is plausible that any progress in rendering
people autonomous and equal with respect to risk in production will
affect risk in reproduction: reducing risk in one sphere will reduce it in
the other (although there still will be externalities), 29' and people ac-
customed to autonomy and equality at work will not readily tolerate
being subjected by others to unequal risks at home.
Risk at work is collective: workers experience dangers that are
identical or at least similar; risk, injury, and illness are visible to others;
co-workers often have close, enduring social relationships; and of
course many workers are organized into trade unions. Consumers, by
contrast, encounter risk individually: although others are exposed to
similar (if not identical) risks, those endangered rarely are visible,
much less known; and the "free market" disorganizes consumers into
atomistic individuals.292 Although scientific management seeks to
transform workers into automatons, they still remain creative partici-
290. At the beginning of 1978, it was estimated that injuries attributable to unsafe prod-
ucts cost $9.5 billion per year (excluding illnesses). See M. GREEN & N. WAITZMAN, supra
note 96, at 156. This figure obviously has to be increased to take account of automobile
accidents. However, these are less clearly associated with the sphere of reproduction than
might appear. Many accidents occur during work or on the way to or from work. Many are
attributable to the design of automobiles or to the efforts of automobile manufacturers to
encourage driving by opposing mass transit alternatives. Subsidization of the latter and the
withdrawal of subsidies from the former would do much to reduce this source of risk. One
problem with my emphasis is a societal one. Because a larger percentage of men than wo-
men work outside of the home, men are disproportionately victims at the workplace. On the
other hand, women (and children) encounter more risk in the home than men. See ROYAL
COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY, I REPORT
(Cmnd. 7054, 1978) [hereinafter cited as ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT]; Burman, Gen &
Lyons, The Use of Legal Services By Victims of Accidents in the Home-A Pilot Study, 40
Moo. L. REV. 47 (1979); H. Genn, The Use of Legal Services by Victims of Accidental
Injury 24 (1980) (unpublished manuscript).
291. This is not because workers who also are owners and share risk within the enterprise
will be more altruistic. If anything, they have a greater incentive (profit) than they do pres-
ently to seek to externalize accident costs. My argument is more modest: workers and con-
sumers share many risks (though by no means all). Toxic chemicals are a good example: a
constituent of a product that endangers the ultimate consumer also will endanger the produ-
cer, who usually will be exposed to greater concentrations for longer periods. If the worker
can control his own exposure (which he cannot do under capitalism), his pursuit of simple
self-interest also will benefit the consumer.
292. When the U.S. Department of Transportation discovered that consumers were mak-
ing frequent use of the results of its tests of cars for crashworthiness, which were published
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pants who define their own tasks - and must do so if the capitalist
enterprise is to function. Consumers, on the other hand, often are truly
passive. Workers are knowledgeable about the functions they perform
and the risks they run (usually more so than management, Taylorism
notwithstanding), whereas consumers believe themselves to be igno-
rant - and generally are. Because workers experience a limited
number of relatively high risks, they are specialists in danger and there-
fore have a considerable investment in doing something about it. Con-
sumers, however, are exposed to an infinite variety of risks, many of
which are quite small; as generalists, their interest in reducing any par-
ticular risk is greatly diluted.293 Thus, whereas it appears to be more
difficult to equalize the risks experienced by workers than to give them
autonomous control, the reverse may be true for consumers.294
The characteristics of consumers that deprive them of autonomy
and subject them to unequal risks are intimately associated with capi-
talism. The enormous increase in the division of labor and the rise of
professionalism render consumers dependent on others for both goods
and services. Class differentiation in income, education, leisure, etc.
creates huge differences in the risks to which consumers are exposed.
Capitalism makes two responses to the charge that it fosters depen-
dence and inequality. The first is the "choice" that the "free market"
purports to offer the consumer. But the prerequisites for meaningful
choice are not satisfied: many consumers have inadequate resources;
capitalists and professionals systematically conceal the information a
in THE CAR BOOK (1980), it decided to withdraw some of the information - presumably
under pressure from the manufacturers of those automobiles that performed poorly.
293. See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 143 (1962). Compare Kafka, 4
Hunger Artfist, in FRANz KAFKA: THE COMPLETE STORIES 268 (N. Glatzer ed. 1971) with
the ordinary person who simply is hungry. In Isaiah Berlin's metaphor, the consumer is a
fox, the worker a hedgehog.
294. I have discussed the difficulty of justifying equal risk at work and of implementing
such a principle. See supra text accompanying notes 59-89 & 144-267. Even when workers
secure autonomy they do not always seek to share risk equally. I believe that a larger
number and a broader spectrum of people would accept the ideal that consumer goods and
services should carry equal risks - that a Cadillac and a Datsun should be just as crash-
worthy, that the danger of medical malpractice should not turn on whether the patient is rich
or poor. Most people are taken aback when the opposite position is championed explicitly,
as when James C. Miller, III, the new chairman of the Federal Trade Commisison, argued in
his inaugural press conference for "imperfect products" in order to allow "those who have a
low aversion to risks - relative to money" to buy "cheap, unreliable products." Quoted in
West Coast Ass'n of Marxist Historians Newsletter, Jan. 1982, at 2. But I doubt that all who
share my abhorrence for that view would agree that the consumer ought to determine the
level of risk. Furthermore, efforts to achieve consumer autonomy encounter considerable
political and structural obstacles. See, e.g., Wilson & Brydolf, Grass Roots Solutions.- San
Francisco Consumer Action, in No ACCESS TO LAW (L. Nader ed. 1980).
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consumer would need to exercise choice; 295 and producers of both
goods and services may conspire to deny consumers a choice. Ac-
knowledging market failure, the capitalist state creates regulatory agen-
cies to protect consumers from risk: the Food and Drug
Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Administration, the
Federal Aviation Administration, licensing boards for physicians, law-
yers, and other professionals; the list is endless. Yet the criticisms of
regulation are too well known to require rehearsal here.
B. A Solution
Consumers must regain autonomous control over the risks to
which they are exposed. Regulation merely exchanges ignorant depen-
dence on capital for ignorant dependence on the capitalist state. Is
there an alternative? I believe that the market still offers the greatest
potential for consumer autonomy if it can be restructured to approxi-
mate more closely the assumptions of neoclassical economics.296 This
will require the disorganization of the units of production so that (sin-
gly or in combination) they are less able to dominate consumers.
Worker ownership and control is consistent with this objective because
producer cooperatives have inherent limitations on their size. Recreat-
ing a "free market" for commodities (other than labor) also will require
the organization of consumers through consumer cooperatives.
Whereas the producer cooperatives of the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries largely had died out before the recent revival,297 con-
sumer cooperatives have enjoyed greater continuity: there were 3,300
farm supply rural cooperatives, 1,000 rural electric cooperatives, and
1,050 cooperative stores in 1957,298 and the numbers have grown since
then.299
The consumer cooperative has a number of objectives. It seeks to
transform consumption from the parallel behavior of an anonymous
mass of atomized individuals into an occasion for building community.
295. The thalidomide tragedy vividly illustrates the potential consequences for consumers
who are poorly informed. See INSIGHT TEAM OF THE SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDON, SUFFER
THE CHILDREN: THE STORY OF THALIDOMIDE (1979); D. MASON, THALIDOMIDE: MY
FIGHT (1976); H. TEFF & C. MUNRO, THALIDOMIDE: THE LEGAL AFTERMATH (1976); see
also R. HARRIS, THE REAL VOICE (1964) (consumer information and prescription drugs
generally); I. PAULUS, THE SEARCH FOR PURE FOOD: A SOCIOLOGY OF LEGISLATION IN
BRITAIN (1975) (consumer information - food).
296. My proposal thus concedes both the continued differentiation of producers and con-
sumers and the inevitability of antagonistic relations between them.
297. K. BERMAN, supra note 143, at 10-15.
298. COOPERATIVE LEAGUE OF THE U.S.A., FACT BOOK ON COOPERATIVES (2d ed. 1959).
299. W. RONCo, FOOD Co-ops (1974); Zwerdling, The Uncertain Revival ofFood Cooper-
atives, in Co-oPs, COMMUNES & COLLECTIVES (J. Case & R. Taylor 1979).
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It seeks to empower the consumer through the economic leverage
gained by buying collectively. It also allows (and may require) the con-
sumer to substitute his or her own labor for some of the overhead costs
of merchandising. And of course it gives consumers the benefit of what
would have been retailer profits. As a result prices in cooperative stores
generally are lower than those charged by capitalist enterprises, some-
times by as much as a third.3" Cooperatives also may free consumers
from reliance on others for goods and services: one worker-owned
auto-repair shop, for instance, instructed customers in how to fix their
own cars.3"' Finally, and most pertinent to this article, cooperatives
may use their collective power and knowledge to reduce consumer risk:
by seeking to persuade their members to switch to healthier diets, by
refusing to carry junk foods (which often bring the highest profit mar-
gins), or by placing warnings on dangerous foods like bacon. 2
Cooperatives foster consumer autonomy. By themselves, however,
they do not solve the problem of unequal risk. The additional condi-
tion, which is both necessary and sufficient, is equalization of income.
Such equalization is needed to make cooperatives attractive to people
other than the middle class professionals who presently have the time
and disposable income to devote to consumer choice. Producer cooper-
atives would do a great deal to equalize income, as I discussed in the
previous section. But just as workers would retain the power to trade-
off increases in the average risk of their workplaces in exchange for
greater income, so consumers would be free to incur more or less risk in
the goods and services they buy.30 3
Consumer cooperatives will have to overcome many hurdles. Like
their analogues in the realm of production, their very survival con-
stantly is threatened by lack of access to finance, competitors with
vastly greater market power, the inadequacy of members' business
skills, etc. One of the greatest problems is to inspire and maintain
member participation. A retail enterprise in which members own
shares and merely elect a board of directors that hires managers who
actually exercise control is no more cooperative than a capitalist enter-
prise nominally owned by its employees through a stock-option plan. °n
Yet the consumer cooperative faces obstacles to participation even
300. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 131, at 84. But see Zwerdling, supra note 299, at 92.
301. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 131, at 85. This example, of course, is a producer not a
consumer cooperative, but the principle is equally applicable to both.
302. Id. at 84, 88.
303. Indeed, the trade-offs are related. A producer who opted for a workplace that was
less dangerous also would receive a lower income and thus have less money to spend on
avoiding risk as a consumer.
304. Cooperative stores associated with universities often are examples.
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greater than those confronting the producer cooperative: whereas
workers simply can take time off from production to engage in govern-
ance (they are on the premises already and can be "paid" for the time
they expend), consumers have to juggle numerous competing demands
on their time and leave their homes in order to travel to the coopera-
tive.305 Consumers are more inclined than workers to relinquish con-
trol to hired staff, especially since consumers lack the relevant
expertise. 31 But this not only forfeits autonomy, it also may lead to the
exploitation of staff who, after all, remain employees of a capitalist en-
terprise (if one that extracts its profits in savings), especially since con-
sumer cooperatives generally pay their workers poorly.3 7 For this
reason staff should be kept to a minimum by requiring all members to
contribute time to the cooperative and refusing to allow that obligation
to be commuted to a money payment.30 8 Each member would be obli-
gated to become familiar with a range of products or services in order
to advise the cooperative about the price, quality, and risks associated
with its purchases. Because each member would be mutually depen-
dent on every other, it would not be necessary to rotate this responsibil-
ity (nor would it be desirable, for that would interfere with the
acquisition of expertise), although other tasks might be shared.
Meaningful participation in cooperative decisionmaking imposes
limitations on the size of consumer as well as producer cooperatives. 3 9
This detracts from the capacity of the cooperative to attain other objec-
tives. It decreases the cooperative's economic leverage in bargaining
with producers over price, product design, quality, and safety, although
several cooperatives could collaborate to aggregate their purchasing
power. It also restricts the range of goods that can be stocked, thereby
reducing consumer choice. Consumers could increase their alternatives
by joining several cooperatives (each of which specialized in an area of
goods or services), but that would dilute still further the time and en-
ergy a member could invest in each. Consumers simply may have to
curtail the variety of goods and services among which they can choose
if they wish to make these choices autonomously. Would that be a
major sacrifice? Capitalists certainly think so: they spend extraordi-
305. Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 99, at 519-20.
306. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 86.
307. Id. at 292.
308. The same reasons that prohibit substitute payment for the obligation of military
service apply here. See supra note 79. Interestingly, as the legal profession examines more
seriously the idea of mandatory pro bono public service, it also has begun to consider in-lieu
payments. See F. MARKS, supra note 132; Brill, TheABA Revolution, AM. LAW., Dec., 1981,
at 5.
309. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 130, at 87.
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nary amounts on advertising to convince consumers that the superficial
differences between competing products present them with truly mo-
mentous decisions and that the right to make those choices is the core
meaning of the "freedom" that liberal political theory proclaims as its
paramount value. The capitalist state recently has endorsed that
message: the Supreme Court has extended. limited first amendment
protection to some forms of commercial speech.31° The capitalist equa-
tion of liberty with commodity exchange is so powerful that it has even
persuaded youth in Eastern Europe and Russia to define freedom as
the right to purchase Western consumer goods; 31' and many of the re-
cent refugees from Cuba acknowledged that they were motivated by
similar desires. Yet political freedom must not be trivialized by identi-
fying it with the purchase of goods and services; we can be uncompro-
mising in demanding the former and still accept limitations on what we
consume. We are not what we eat or what we wear. This is not to
argue that consumption is irrelevant to autonomy. But individuals who
passively accept the choices that capitalist producers construct never
enjoy meaningful consumer autonomy. They can only pursue it
through collective (i.e., political) action, voluntary constriction of the
choices to be made, and greater self-reliance.
If consumers are to seek autonomy through collective action, what
should be done about those risks that resist aggregation? Surely it
would be too difficult to organize the consumers of many services:
travel (airplane passengers, but also car drivers concerned about high-
way design), sports (participants, for instance skiers, and spectators, for
instance hockey fans), food and drink (restaurant and bar patrons), etc.
The transaction costs of creating additional collectivities, the likelihood
of apathy, and the free-rider problem present substantial, and probably
insuperable, obstacles. One solution might be to internalize all acci-
dent costs in the price of those goods and services (i.e., strict liability).
This, however, would introduce the transaction costs of shifting the loss
from consumer victim to producer or seller, and we know from our
experience with both negligence and strict liability that a very large
proportion of victims would fail to secure compensation. 312 Another
310. See, e.g., In re R. - M.J.-, 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982); Consolidated Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Consolidated Edison v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark
Ass'n v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). For a
critique of the "commercial speech" doctrine, see Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in
THE POLITICS OF LAw (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
311. A. LEE, RUSSIAN JOURNAL (1981).
312. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 290, at 11-13; P. BARTH & H. HUNT, SUpra
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possibility would be to treat the accident cost as a cost of consumption
(rather than production) and leave it on the victim, but there is little
reason to believe that this would encourage autonomous, informed de-
cisions about risk. Furthermore, we no longer tolerate the inhumanity
of abandoning victims to their own resources and, if these are inade-
quate, to poverty and misery (nor should we) but instead provide mini-
mal income maintenance and medical care. This may reduce, if it does
not entirely vitiate, the effect of internalizing the loss in the victim. I
will return below to this question of externalized risk.
V. CONCLUSION
In advocating producer and consumer cooperatives as the institu-
tional forms through which a decentralized socialism might advance
autonomous control over and equality of risk, I conceded that signifi-
cant problems remain, both structural and political. Efforts to equalize
risk between enterprises seem inconsistent with worker control over
risk within each enterprise. Organizing consumption through coopera-
tives engenders its own problems: sustaining member involvement,
constricting the range of choice, and dealing with those goods and serv-
ices whose consumers cannot easily be aggregated. This last is just one
instance of the recurrent problem of externalities - risks created by
one activity or enterprise but inflicted on those outside it. Decentral-
ized socialism does not eliminate externalities. Producer cooperatives
may generate noise, air, or water pollution that affects workers in other
cooperatives, nearby residents, or even remote environments. Con-
sumer cooperatives and neighborhoods may produce sewage that pol-
lutes other neighborhoods. Certain activities common to both
production and consumption endanger not only the actor but also
others, who may belong to a different collectivity - car driving is the
best example. There are several ways to handle the problem of exter-
nalities. One would be to rotate people among various producer and
consumer cooperatives so that the risks no longer were so clearly exter-
nal: a person whose collectivity generated the risk might simultane-
ously be suffering it elsewhere, or care about those endangered, or have
been in that situation in the past, or expect to be in the future. But, as I
discussed earlier, such rotation would undermine group solidarity, dis-
note 96, at 161-87; A. CONARD, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS (1964); R.
HUNTING & G. NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY? A STUDY OF AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT CLAIMS (1962); T. ISON, THE FORENSIC LOTTERY (1967); J. O'CONNELL, THE
LAWSUIT LOTTERY (1979); Burman, Gen & Lyons, supra note 290; Franklin, Chanin &
Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litiga-
tion, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1961); H. Genn, supra note 290.
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rupt individual lives, and require a large, coercive administrative
apparatus.
Another solution is for the person placed at risk to bargain with
the person or entity responsible for generating it. Neoclassical econo-
mists who advocate this approach make a number of extremely dubi-
ous assumptions about the transaction costs involved in such
negotiations, access to information, bargaining power, etc.313 Organiz-
ing producers and consumers into collectivities, however, might make
negotiation a more realistic possibility. An individual consumer today
can hardly bargain with General Motors about the safety of the car she
wishes to buy. But it is quite possible that a consumer cooperative, or
even better several of them together, could negotiate over product
safety with producer cooperatives of roughly comparable size.
Nevertheless, numerous situations would remain in which those
who generate risk and those who suffer it are not negotiating and can-
not readily do so - because they cannot be identified in advance, or
because they cannot be aggregated without excessive cost, etc. That is
one of the reasons why we have governments. 314 Some decisions about
risk have to be made by collectivities larger than producer or consumer
cooperatives (or even groups of cooperatives) - some require action by
the state, or even the region or the world. And these decisions have to
be backed by civil sanctions or criminal penalties. In other words, it is
not possible to dispense entirely with litigation and regulation; the state
may never wither away altogether. But we may be able to limit its
functions substantially if producers and consumers gain autonomy
through collective action. Furthermore, just as the organization of pro-
ducers and consumers into units of roughly equivalent size will help to
achieve the free market of neoclassical economics (and thus the "effi-
cient" allocation of risk through negotiation), so it will advance the
ideals of liberal pluralism by equalizing political power, with the result
that the allocation of risk through state action (legislation, regulation,
and adjudication) can more plausibly be viewed as expressing a con-
313. For critiques of the Coase theorem, see Heller, The Importance of Normative Deci-
sionmaking: The Limitations ofLegal Economics as a Basisfor Liberal Jurisprudence - as
Illustrated by the Regulation of Vacation Home Development, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 385; Kel-
man, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S.
CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979); Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 769; Symposium on
Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980); A Response to the Efficiency
Symposium, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811 (1980).
314. Only government could make the decision to reduce risk to both producers and the
environment by curtailing production, as environmentalists in the United States and Europe
have been urging for some time. Government also must decide who has the initial entitle-
ment (e.g., to pollute or to be free from pollution) before negotiation can take place.
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sensus of the wishes of the constituent groups and their members
(whose fundamental antagonisms have been eliminated). 315
If decentralized socialism cannot perfectly realize the ideals of au-
tonomy and equality in the allocation of risk, it certainly is an enor-
mous improvement over the existing system, which renders both
workers and consumers powerless and unequal. Can it be imple-
mented? Obviously that question cannot be answered simply by
weighing the merits of my proposals against those of the allocation of
risk under contemporary capitalism.316 Decentralized socialism re-
quires revolutionary change. It will be championed by those who are
most oppressed and who best are able both to perceive their oppression
and to believe in the possibility of change. Certainly, involuntary sub-
jection to unequal risks is only one element of capitalist oppression; but
the salience and volatility of these issues are suggested by union and
rank and file agitation over the issue of worker health and safety and
by the consumer and environmental movements.317 Yet if decentral-
ized socialism is revolutionary, it also, by definition, is gradual. It does
not require an initial cataclysm, and partial advances need not await
total victory. Producer and consumer cooperatives can be created
within the framework of the capitalist economy and state; they can co-
exist (though uneasily) with bourgeois society and its ideological he-
gemony. These are exemplary rather than confrontational institu-
tions.318 Indeed, there is evidence that capitalism itself, in its struggle
315. C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970). This hardly is an
original idea; compare G. COLE, GUILD SOCIALISM RESTATED (1920).
316. For accounts of the political struggle, see WORKERS' CONTROL, PART iv (G. Hun-
nius, G. Garson & J. Case eds. 1973).
317. See D. BERMAN, supra note 16, ch. 5-6; A. DALTON, ASBESTOS KILLER DUST: A
WORKER/COMMUNITY GUIDE: How To FIGHT THE HAZARDS OF ASBESTOS AND ITS SUB-
STITUTES (1979); BRITISH SOCIETY FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN SCIENCE, HAZARDS BUL-
LETIN (1976 to date).
The numerous Committees on Occupational Safety and Health that have emerged
around the country in the last few years indicate the workers' concern. Furthermore, the
threat of toxic wastes in the environment has stimulated community action. See, e.g., P.
BLANC, STOP ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER: AN EPIDEMIC OF THE PETROCHEMICAL AGE: A
CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO ORGANIZING (1980); M. BROWN, supra note 7; L. GIBBS, supra note 7;
A. LEVINE, THE LOVE CANAL (1982).
318. Starr, The Phantom Community, in Co-ops, COMMUNES & COLLECTIVES 245 (J.
Case & R. Taylor eds. 1979); Gorz, supra note 189, at 342-43. Because I believe that the
greatest obstacle to socialism in the United States is the workers' inability to visualize decen-
tralized socialism as a realistic alternative - by reason of a strong (and proper) aversion to
the authoritarian regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe - the importance of
creating exemplary socialist experiments within our own society cannot be exaggerated.
This is not to diminish the value of electoral campaigns - witness France and Greece -
workplace struggles, or other counter-hegemonic efforts to demonstrate the way in which
capitalism produces injury and illness - for instance, through criminal prosecution of capi-
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to resolve awesome internal and external contradictions, is fostering the
proliferation of such institutions. Witness the growth of worker owner-
ship through employee stock-option plans, pension fund investments,
and purchases of failing enterprises; 319 capitalist concessions of control
to workers in order to remedy the high levels of apathy and alienation
that reduce productivity and render American industry uncompetitive
with its Japanese or European counterparts; 320 and attempts to resolve
the crisis of underconsumption by restoring consumer autonomy and
confidence. This is not to suggest that producer and consumer coopera-
tives will have an easy path: they have elicited, and will continue to
stimulate, opposition from capital (both enterprise and finance), the
state apparatus it controls, and the bourgeois culture it spawns.321 But
the benefits of decentralized socialism will continue to be obvious and
overwhelming to those who participate in efforts to create it and in-
creasingly to others still oppressed by capitalist relations of production
and reproduction.
talist officials who consciously disregard risk to producers and consumers in their drive for
profits. See Glasbeek & Rowland, Are Injuring and Killing at Work Crimes?, 17 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 506 (1979).
319. P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: How PENSION-FUND SOCIALISM CAME
TO AMERICA (1976).
320. WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 47, ch. 4; J. O'TOOLE, supra note 245.
321. Rothschild-Whitt, supra note 99, at 522-23.
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